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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM 
In the decade following the Cold War, the frequency of Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
mandated by the United Nations increased tactical level training requirements to prepare both 
individuals and units for various operations.  Further, deficiencies in United Nations operations 
within Somalia during 1993 compelled many nations and regional organizations to either 
enhance pre-existing training programs or establish specific PSO training centers.  However, 
without an institutionalized PSO training program, the United States military continues to lack 
adequate tactical-level training. 
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This research presents a comparative analysis of several PSO training programs at the 
international, regional, and national levels to identify criteria and curricular components essential 
for developing a tactical level PSO training program in the U.S. Military.  Specifically, in 
addition to examining the UN model for PSO training at the international level, this research 
analyzes several Euro-Atlantic PSO training perspectives by examining the Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) regional organization and the national training 
programs of the Canadian Forces, the German Armed Forces, and the U.S. Military.  Further, 
training program criteria are utilized to identify training program strengths and weaknesses of 
these models.  Although a specific PSO training curriculum for the U.S. Military is not 
prescribed, this research identifies critical criteria for developing a viable program by examining 
commonalities, strengths, and weaknesses of pre-existing models. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary research question:  Upon completing a comparative assessment of several PSO 
training models, what curricular considerations, educational areas, and instructional 
methodologies are pertinent to a tactical level PSO training program in the U.S. Military? 
2 
Secondary research questions: 
1. How many PSO training models currently exist throughout the world?  
2. What organizations are responsible for developing and implementing PSO training 
programs within selected countries?  Are the programs centralized in the form of joint 
training or decentralized by service departments? 
3. What are the curricular components of current PSO training programs?  
• Residential versus distance learning 
• Degree/certificate completion 
• Length of curriculum 
• Balance of general and specific/contextual training 
• Other 
4. What training methodologies, such as simulation, classroom instruction, and electronic 
learning, are being utilized to provide instruction?  
5. How have national strategies, cultural sensitivities, lessons learned, and other factors 
contributed to the development of PSO training models? 
 
D. RESEARCH SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This study does not seek to identify and prescribe a specific curriculum for an “ideal” 
PSO training model within the U.S. Military.  However, through a comparative analysis of 
several pre-existing training models, the researcher seeks to identify organizational structures, 
curricular components, and essential relationships for developing an effective training model. 
Research limitations developed primarily from time constraints for obtaining specific 
information concerning each training model.  Further, when communicating and coordinating 
with representatives from PSO training programs in other countries, language complications, in 
terms of written translations and the availability of applicable data, limited the scope of analysis.  
While general information and historical references could be obtained from the library and 
Internet resources, specific curricula content and training methodologies for each organization 
required extensive research and follow-up.  Ideally, as completed in first-hand observations of 
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the Canadian Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) program, the researcher would obtain the 
most accurate and realistic data through observations of all selected training models.  However, 
time constraints and funding deficiencies limited the collection of participatory, onsite data. 
With respect to environmental factors, this research assumes that political, social, and 
economic factors affect the development of PSO training programs within their larger 
organizations, whether at the international, regional, or national level.  Therefore, the 
conclusions and recommendations provided in this research focus on a specific aspect of PSO 
training—improving performance of personnel and units at the tactical level of PSO.  
Repercussions in other areas of training or within the overall system are not formally examined.      
 
E. BACKGROUND 
Following the Cold War, Peace Support Operations (PSO) changed considerably in their 
nature and complexity; likewise, military training requirements for personnel involved in such 
operations evolved and developed.  In the case of Operation Restore Hope, which took place in 
Somalia from 1992 to 1993, military contingents became entangled in a bloody civil war while 
providing humanitarian assistance to the local populace.  In March of 1993, 21 countries were 
participating in a UN peacekeeping force dedicated to providing humanitarian relief and 
promoting nation building.  However, following the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by 
belligerent Somalis, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution to capture 
those responsible for the crimes and bring them to justice.  Further, the mission focused on the 
capture of General Aidid, a dominant clan leader, who criticized UN efforts.  As the UN mandate 
changed, the Somali people perceived certain contingents of the multi-national force, most 
notably the United States and its subordinate units, as aggressors.  Actually, military units that 
were once respected and admired were no longer viewed as impartial peacekeepers.  Serving as 
Director of Operations, General Anthony Zinni, USMC, stated “(Military units) were no longer 
in peace enforcement or peacekeeping...(they were) in a counter-insurgency or some form of 
war”  (“Ambush in Mogadishu”).  Then, as the hunt for General Aidid continued, 18 U.S. Army 
Rangers were ambushed and killed on October 3, 1993 during a hotel raid to capture the warlord 
and his lieutenants.  Ultimately, the dynamics of PSO in Somalia represent only a fraction of the 
complexities facing military personnel assigned as modern-day peacekeepers.  Therefore, 
4 
training models for PSO require flexible, yet standardized, curricular components to prepare 
service members for such missions. 
Currently, the United Nations and the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden, are further enhancing their respective PSO training programs to prepare for future 
missions.  Also, from a Euro-Atlantic perspective, the Canadian Forces and the German Armed 
Forces continue to develop their own national programs, while strengthening relations with other 
PSO training organizations.  However, the United States Military has not established an 
institutionalized program for conducting PSO training at the tactical level for individuals and 
units.  Further, the New York Times reported that the Army Peacekeeping Institute, which 
develops U.S. Military PSO doctrine and maintains liaison with international peace 
organizations, might close (“Army May Shut Peacekeeping Office” 12 Mar. 2002).  While this 
organization does not directly address tactical-level training issues, it symbolizes a commitment 
to long-standing peace within the international community. Additionally, the Army 
Peacekeeping Institute could play an integral role in developing and overseeing training 
programs at the individual and contingent levels. 
 
F. METHODOLOGY 
1.  Overview 
This section discusses the research methodology used to identify criteria and curricular 
components essential for further developing tactical level PSO training for U.S. Forces.  Rather 
than limiting the research to national programs, aspects of regional and international training 
were examined as well.  Specifically, national PSO training models of the United States Army, 
the Canadian Armed Forces, and the German Military were studied.  Additionally, the Nordic 
Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) and the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) were examined at the regional and 
international levels, respectively.   
Initially, the background chapter developed a framework to identify requisite knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes of military personnel designated for PSO.  Subsequently, based on specified 
training program criteria, a comparative analysis of the training models was conducted.  Finally, 
based on commonalities, strengths, and weaknesses of current training models, this research 
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identified critical considerations for examining alternative PSO models for the U.S. Armed 
Forces; however, a specific curriculum for a U.S. Military PSO training program was not 
prescribed.   
 
2. Research Design 
This research utilized a case study analysis to assess and compare PSO training programs 
at the national, regional, and international levels.  For this exploratory study, methods of inquiry 
and data collection included the following: 
1. Archival research.  Training program materials and documentation were obtained 
from books, academic studies, Internet web sites, and multimedia sources. 
2. Informal discussions with staff members of the selected PSO training programs 
and associated subject matter experts (SME) provided further information. 
3. Participatory observation.  First-hand, observational data pertinent to the 
Canadian Forces model was obtained by attending a one-week basic PSO course 
at the PSTC, Canadian Forces Base Kingston, Ontario, Canada.  Contextual 
information, such as student class participation, motivation, and interactions with 
staff members, provided additional insight into the academic model.  In addition 
to course materials and documentation, demographic data for student attendees 
were obtained for 717 personnel who attended one of 27 course sessions in 2001.  
However, statistical findings related to these participants cannot be considered a 
random sample among all students who received training sponsored by the PSTC.  
Comparable participant demographic data could not be obtained from the other 
training models examined. 
4. Informal interviews.  Depending upon the model, phone interviews, e-mail 
correspondence, and onsite dialogue with instructors, program managers, and 
command representatives provided relevant data. 
For conducting the comparative analysis, training program data were qualitatively 




3. Curricular Formulization 
4. Coordination & Communication Mechanisms 
5. Participants 
6. Evaluation Methods 
7. Feedback Mechanisms 
In addition to historical overviews, the training programs were analyzed based on curricular 
characteristics, such as program duration, training locations, instructor requirements, 
implementation of training standards, and methods of training feedback and evaluation.   
Rather than determining the “success” of these PSO training programs, this thesis focuses 
on exploring practical and effective means of improving PSO training for U.S. Military 
personnel.  Therefore, this research does not conduct a quantitative assessment in comparing 
training models.  Perhaps, in this regard, further research could examine the occurrence of 
casualties among personnel who completed different training programs.  From a military 
perspective, limiting the loss of personnel is extremely important to both the deployed unit and 
its country of origin.  However, the desired end state of establishing or maintaining long-standing 
peace may not be correlated with such quantitative measures.   Also, comparing personnel 
performance with respect to training programs completed would be extremely difficult 
considering the vast number of variables related to factors at the strategic and operational levels, 
such as force size and degree of participation in various missions.  Ultimately, the “success” of a 
PSO training program does not correspond to commonplace measures of productivity or cost-
savings.  Alternatively, PSO training should result in learning among individual participants, 
while the military organization maintains stability in the mission area.  Ultimately, diplomatic 
measures seek success through either achieving relative peace or maintaining societal security.     
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II provides a literature review of United Nations PSO, including functions/types 
of missions, training fundamentals, and an overview of personnel roles, required knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSAs) of participants, and task differentiation. 
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Chapter III presents data on the United Nations model for PSO training, primarily 
focusing on the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO).   
Chapter IV presents data on the Nordic Countries regional model for PSO training, 
specifically the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) program.  
Chapter V presents data on the Canadian Forces model for PSO training by examining 
the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) designated for preparing military personnel for PSO.   
Chapter VI presents data on the German Armed Forces model, focusing on the German 
UN Training Center within the German Infantry School.   
Chapter VII presents data on the U.S. Military model for PSO training, specifically 
focusing on the Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site under the U.S. 
Army Infantry School.   
Chapter VIII assesses data collected from the PSO training programs through a 
comparative analysis of specific program criteria. 
Chapter IX addresses the initial research questions, while providing conclusions and 
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II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS 
A. NATURE AND TYPES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
A state of peace, as it relates to social interaction, has been defined in several ways to 
include:  1) “freedom from war or civil strife, 2) “freedom from public disturbance or disorder; 
public security; law and order”, or 3) “freedom from disagreement from quarrels; harmony; 
concord” (Webster’s New World Dictionary).  Apart from envisioning a mythical Utopian 
society, peace is often described in relative terms from various perspectives.  Despite a lack of 
consensus in defining and identifying peace, Peace Support Operations (PSO) are conducted 
either to maintain the current level of peace or to facilitate the development of peace, while 
diplomatic means are sought to resolve the underlying causes of conflict.  In recent years, the 
nature of PSO has shifted from predominantly peacekeeping requirements, such as those 
identified in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to a wider range of complex operations, covering a 
broad spectrum of conflict intensity levels.  As a consequence, the UN recognizes five different 
types of PSO (UN CD-ROM).. 
1. Preventive Diplomacy (PD)-action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of 
conflicts if they occur 
2. Peace-making (PM)-diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement 
through such peaceful means as those referenced under Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
3. Peacekeeping (PK)-a UN presence that normally involves both military and civilian 
personnel with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the 
implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (ceasefires, separation 
of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the 
safe delivery of humanitarian relief 
4. Peace enforcement (PE)-needed when all other efforts fail; authorization of enforcement 
prescribed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; includes the use of armed force to 
maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the security 
10 
council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression 
5. Peace building (PB)-critical in the aftermath of conflict; includes the identification and 
support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and 
interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict 
From the terminology and definitions presented above, the spectrum of PSO can be best 















Figure 1. Peace Operations Continuum 
 
 
These operations differ significantly from the nature of war fighting, which utilizes the 
application of military force as an extension of foreign policy.  UN guidelines state that 
peacekeeping is incompatible with the use of force (other than in cases of self defense), such as 
that necessitated in peace enforcement (UN CD-ROM).  Furthermore, according to UN 
guidelines, peace support operations should not transition from one operational type to another 
                                                 
1 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations,” Department of Defense Joint Publications 




like amalgamous points on a continuum.  However, an undesirable shift in UN operational type 
may occur based on changes in posture or status between disputing parties, regardless of UN 
intensions and strategic goals.  Ironically, under exceptional circumstances, UN operations may 
be mandated to concurrently carry out both PK and PE operations in a single mission area. 
Whether supported by the interests of individual nations or under UN authority, military 
units assigned to PSO are not directed to “seek out, close with, and destroy” an enemy force.  In 
contrast, military forces serve as facilitators and mediators in fostering/maintaining peace.  
Therefore, training requirements to support PSO must remain flexible and responsive to 
ambiguous, often precarious, situations.  Finally, PSO types vary significantly across missions, 
so training programs may be designed to emphasize a certain section of the PSO continuum.  For 
example, in the disputed Golan Heights area between Israel and Syria, traditional peacekeeping 
principles may apply to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) personnel, 
while peace enforcement techniques may be required for other missions.  Ultimately, military 
units deployed to any mission should be aware of other PSO types, since operations could 
escalate or deescalate with respect to the application of military force. 
 
B. EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
As described in Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, traditional peacekeeping occurs with the 
consent of disputing parties and is carried out by a neutral and lightly armed contingent.  Further, 
force is authorized only in self-defense, since a ceasefire agreement is typically in effect between 
belligerent groups.  The objective of such a mission is to sustain peace while diplomatic efforts 
resolve the underlying conflict.  Military personnel may be assigned to observer missions or unit-
sized forces may be involved.  A long-standing example of traditional PK is the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), initiated by a disagreement between Greeks and 
Turks over control of the island (UN CD-ROM)  According to the United Nations, these 
“Chapter 6” missions are generally classified into one of three categories (UN CD-ROM): 
1. Supervision activity-refers primarily to a military observer mission; verifying, 
supervising, and monitoring 
2. Interpositioning-placing UN military units/observers between warring parties to prevent 
recurrence of fighting 
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3. Humanitarian assistance (relatively new)-refugee relief, monitoring human rights, and de-
mining 
Further, traditional peacekeeping is based on the following principles (Last 45): 
1. Impartiality of the force  
2. Consent of the belligerents (disputing parties)  
3. Minimum use of force  
4. Clarity of mission purpose  
Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the termination of Cold War 
hostilities, “second generation” PSO emerged that sought to implement and oversee a political 
settlement already accepted by the parties of a dispute.  In addition to traditional PK duties, such 
as those required for the UNFICYP mission, UN PSO duties expanded to include organizing 
elections, disarming guerilla forces, providing law enforcement, resettling refugees, and giving 
humanitarian relief. (Benton 38-39)  Instead of waiting for hostilities to occur between disputing 
parties, preventive deployments occurred as an anticipatory type of UN mission designed to 
prevent armed conflict from occurring (UN CD-ROM).  UN deployments to Macedonia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic are examples.  In the late 1980’s, the UN undertook unprecedented 
missions that focused on implementing comprehensive settlements by supervising ceasefires, 
demobilizing/regrouping military forces, and conducting various activities to restore societal 
functions (UN CD-ROM).  UN operations in Namibia and Mozambique were two such missions.  
Finally, the UN played a critical role in overseeing and ensuring the conduct of humanitarian 
missions in the midst of ongoing struggles between disputing parties (UN CD-ROM).  While 
humanitarian missions appeared quite simple in terms of delivering rations and supplies to 
suffering individuals, belligerent struggles led to turmoil in both Yugoslavia and Somalia PSO. 
According to Findlay, peacekeepers of today are typically involved in intra-state wars, 
such as the long-standing civil wars endured by Mozambique and Angola; such civil conflicts of 
this nature were not traditionally engaged by the UN (13).  Further, current PSO are typically 
characterized by either limited or non-existent consent from the conflicting parties for a UN 
presence and its activities (Findlay 13).  Although modern PSO vary in nature and type, troop-
contributing Member States of the United Nations have learned that peacekeeping (PK) does not 
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equal peace enforcement (PE) (Benton 39).  Even if peace enforcement does not develop out of a 
PK mission, new PK are more likely to use force, if only in either self-defense or defense of the 
mission (Findlay 29).  Ultimately, Findlay describes the delicate balance as follows, “The proper 
use of force is critical in a peace operation.  The use of force to attain a short-term tactical 
success could lead to a long-term strategic failure…. commanders should regard the use of force 
as a last resort.” (28) 
 
C. REASONS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS GROWTH 
Following the Cold War, the U.S. and former Soviet Union began to participate in 
numerous PSO.  Between 1988 and 1992, 13 PKO were initiated, which equaled the entire 
number undertaken during the 40-year existence of the UN (Jett 9).  Paradoxically, the Cold War 
had actually deterred and stifled many smaller, regional conflicts; civil wars within these “new” 
nations and associated instability increased significantly.  Along these same lines, the nature of 
armed conflict shifted from an East-West rivalry to myriad asymmetrical conflicts.  Intra-nation 
struggles escalated between rebels and untrained armies, utilizing light weapons, guerilla tactics, 
and terrorism.  Concurrently, the number of civilian casualties in war increased from 73% in the 
1970’s to nearly 90% in 1990; a proportional increase in refugees necessitated greater 
humanitarian assistance (Jett 9).  Next, humanitarian concerns stimulated the need for PSO.  
Rather than either taking no action or resorting to military force, humanitarian relief efforts, as 
part of PSO, were elevated to a higher level of importance within the international arena (Jett 
10).  Finally, advanced information technology allowed the media to disseminate information 
worldwide in a matter of minutes.  Personnel images, ranging from senior government officials 
to the lowest ranking military member, could be immediately broadcasted.  Such global 
communications gained the attention of numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which affected both the political climate and the tactical scene in the proliferation of PSO. 
 
D. PARTICIPANTS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.”—Former UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold (FM 100-23, 1) 
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The key participants in PSO are military contingents from individual nations, 
regional/international organizations, governmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, disputing parties to the conflict, and the local populace.  With respect to the 
military component, personnel represent various rank levels and years of experience.  Further, 
they may be reservists, such as those common to Scandinavian countries, or predominantly 
career soldiers, such as those from Canada or Ireland (Benton 87).   
 
E. LEVELS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
In addition to the numerous types of PSO, planning, developing, and implementing such 
operations occurs at three separate, yet interrelated, levels: 
1. Strategic:  The UN, Member States, and non-state actors seek to contain, moderate, and 
resolve hostilities through diplomatic, economic, and military means; deterrence and 
coercion may be utilized to de-escalate conflicts; strategic decisions set the overall 
structure in which the operational and tactical levels function (Last 3) 
2. Operational:  Strategic goals are transformed by a force headquarters into a strategy of 
third party intervention that consists of forces to control and prevent violence; campaign 
planning at the operational level sets the framework for success in the prevention, 
containment, and moderation of violence at the tactical level; a tenet of peacekeeping 
involves avoiding violent conflict while facilitating de-escalation between disputing 
parties (Last 4) 
3. Tactical:  Units and staff members interact with the belligerents and the civilian populace 
to prevent further violence and to rebuild normal life, including a return to peaceful social 
relations (Last 4) 
Accordingly, when developing PSO training programs, three basic levels of education 
must be considered from the highest to lowest echelons (UN CD-ROM): 
1. Strategic: Required for individuals and institutions involved in shaping or influencing 
policies and goals at the international, regional, and national levels 
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2. Operational: Applicable to those personnel responsible for developing and implementing 
operational concepts and plans that will accomplish the UN mandate for a PK2 mission; 
along with developing staff and managerial skills, training methods are explained 
3. Tactical:  Conducted for units, teams, and individuals designated for or likely to be 
assigned to a PK mission 
 
F. TASKS AND TECHNIQUES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS  
At the tactical level of PSO, personnel must be trained in accurate and impartial 
observation methods to obtain information about disputing parties and the operational 
environment.  Static and mobile techniques for gathering information are commonly utilized; 
static forms consist of positions and observation posts, while mobile types are associated with 
patrolling, inspections, and investigations.  Additionally, for peacekeeping operations, disputing 
parties must be supervised to ensure adherence to agreements concerning ceasefires, separation 
of forces, disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of military personnel. (UN CD-ROM)  
Within sectors of responsibility established at the operational level, military leaders at the tactical 
level use guards and checkpoints to monitor, limit, or deny access to their areas.  Personnel 
assigned as guards require specific training to ensure tact, courtesy, and professionalism are 
maintained when interacting with the local populace.  Although civilian police normally conduct 
crowd control, military personnel may be utilized in certain cases; the use of force, if required, 
should only be applied at the minimum level necessary to restore order.  Frequently, military 
units are tasked as interposition forces to separate opposing factions and maintain peace.  If 
utilized as a short-term means to quell a potential conflict, control measures and interpositions 
must be quickly followed by negotiations with the disputing parties.  Paradoxically, while 
negotiations are sought, an immediate buildup of military force may effectively deter a conflict 
from escalating. 
At every level of PSO—strategic, operational, and tactical—liaison between PSO 
representatives and disputing parties must be maintained for the purposes of negotiation and 
mediation.  At the strategic level, policy makers and senior leadership should keep open lines of 
communication, while personnel at the operational and tactical levels maintain close, daily 
                                                 
2 Peacekeeping principles are addressed throughout UN guidelines; other types of PSO lack substantial 
reference. 
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contact with counterparts in the area of operations.  For example, while diplomats strive to reach 
an agreement concerning overall peace, soldiers may need to negotiate with local leaders for 
freedom of movement in a certain area.  Given the nature of PSO, a clear and efficient command 
and control structure is critical for communicating between the strategic, operational, and tactical 
command levels.  While diplomats and politicians attempt to set an agenda for issues at the 
strategic level, military personnel involved at the operational and tactical levels must clearly 
understand the mission mandate and their associated duties (UN CD-ROM).  Also, the need to 
carefully control and manage public information is essential at every level of PSO.  In certain 
cases, disputing parties or the local populace may actually disseminate false information for 
propaganda purposes. 
At the operational level of PSO, sectors of responsibility across geographical areas of 
operations may be assigned to military commanders.  In turn, these sectors, often unique due to 
conflicts among the local populace and geographical features, are typically subdivided and 
allocated to subordinate leaders for oversight (UN CD-ROM). 
 
G. TRAINING NEEDS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PEACE 
SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
While decisions and actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of PSO 
directly impact each other, this research focuses on tactical level training programs for personnel 
assigned to mission areas.  Despite variations in PSO types and related requirements, the roles of 
the modern peacekeeper have been categorized as administrator, mediator, and guarantor 
(Findlay 17-18).  In addition to background information about the UN, the nature of PSO, and 
administrative requirements, training should be conducted in the following areas (UN CD-
ROM): 
1. Weapons Familiarity and Training  
• Completing training, range practicing, and testing of personal/crew-served 
weapons systems 
• Gaining familiarity with weapons, vehicles, and equipment being used in the area 
of operations 
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• Obtaining requisite knowledge of Night Vision Equipment (NVE), ground radars, 
and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) warfare 
• Increasing knowledge of mine types, recognition of mined areas, and reactionary 
skills when mines are encountered 
• Completing realistic field exercises that incorporate actual weapons in likely 
scenarios (use of sound effect simulators, engineer demolitions, and other special 
effects)    
2. General Military Training Areas 
• Continuing physical training to ensure troops are able to perform over extended 
operations and under specific climatic and geographical conditions 
• Advancing map reading skills and general knowledge of the mission area 
• Promulgating communication techniques for the unit’s radio net 
• Completing first aid, hygiene, and sanitation instruction 
3. Training in UN Operating Techniques 
• Occupying tactical positions established as checkpoints, road-blacks, or other 
operations; manning observation posts or temporary positions 
• Controlling movement and checking vehicles/pedestrians at static or mobile 
checkpoints/road blocks; conducting searches 
• Learning the aims of patrolling; conducting various types of patrols, such as 
vehicle and foot-mobile 
• Conducting operational investigations and completing required reports (most 
applicable to military police and officers)   
• Negotiating with members of a disputing party or the local populace (common at 
checkpoints); mediating a dispute between representatives from opposing parties 
(usually conducted at the operational or tactical level); maintaining non-partisan 
liaison/communication with disputing parties 
• Understanding the definition of force, principles of using authorized force, and 
application techniques 
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• Communicating with the media; maintaining media relations   
4. Safety Measures and Precautions 
• Setting up shelters for force protection and conducting operations 
• Wearing appropriate personal protection equipment, such as steel/Kevlar helmets, 
fragmentation vests, and NBC suits 
• Traveling procedures/restrictions within the area of operations 
• Completing anti-hijacking drills 
• Utilizing non-operational safety measures to reduce instances of suicide, fires, or 
other health concerns  
5. Specialized Training Areas (may be required for unique missions or 
observers) 
• Completing a driving skills test (primarily for military observers and service 
support personnel) 
• Preparing for PKO helicopter operations in reconnaissance, logistics support, 
medical evacuations, or tactical lift 
• Training for staff members in UN procedures and reporting 
• Completing Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Explosives Ordnance 
Removal (EOR) instruction for qualified personnel     
In additional to familiarization with weapons systems and equipment in the area of 
operations, understanding reactionary measures for mines and booby traps must be deeply 
engrained. 
While the success of PSO depends upon factors at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels, military personnel serving in the mission area require a robust skill set for peace 
operations, which focuses on interpersonal abilities and critical thinking.  Concurrently, they 
must maintain proficiency in combat-related skills through effective, consistent, and continuous 
training.   While traditional military war fighting and PSO roles share many similarities, the 
greatest distinction exists in the level interaction required by military personnel with the local 
populace, UN agencies, other military contingents, government organization, non-governmental 
organizations, disputing parties, and the local populace.  Tactical level training for military 
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participants in PSO must be consistent, thorough, and standardized to ensure compliance with 
such myriad of requirements.  In the following quote, Major Geordie Elms of the Canadian 
Forces captures the unique requirements for PSO training: 
Peacekeeping training entails much more than unarmed combat exercises, 
marksmanship, and obstacle courses; on the ground, the most important talent 
may be walking in the shoes of the native population…The quality you need most 
in United Nations peacekeeping is empathy. (Benton 85) 
Regarding the compatibility of PSO skills with war fighting training, Taw, Persselin, and 
Leed conclude that PSO deployments have reduced war-fighting readiness for certain combat 
units, including infantry and armor elements (43-45).  The mental acuity required for planning 
and executing PSO differs significantly from combat requirements.  Further, since long-term pre-
deployment training is not allocated to PSO, actual PSO deployments and associated 
requirements exert detrimental effects on combat readiness.  In addition to negative effects on 
deployed units, cross-leveling (attaching personnel from external units to meet deployment 
requirements) and interruptions of collective/unit training detract from training in “remain 
behind” units as well.  The researchers also emphasize that deployment requirements for U.S. 
Army personnel in PSO are likely to increase in response to nation building and providing 
humanitarian assistance.  Consequently, additional training must be all-inclusive for personnel in 
unique military occupations, such as transportation, medical, military police, and legal 
specialties.  Finally, the researchers reject the notion of developing a special PSO force within 
the U.S. Army, citing a lack of consistent and deep-rooted requirements. 
To address the numerous types of PSO and to satisfy national policy objectives, various 
training programs and courses have been established within individual nations.  As of March 14, 
2002, the United Nations website identified 81 Member State countries that conduct 
peacekeeping training.  Additionally, regional training organizations, international training 
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III. INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS – MODEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
In the wake of World War II, the United Nations (UN) organization formed on June 26, 
1945, with the goal of maintaining international peace and security.  Initially, founders believed 
that the five predominant powers—China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the former Soviet Union—would act in concert to deter military aggression worldwide.  
However, Cold War tensions between the U.S. and former Soviet Union decreased the 
organization’s resolve and effectiveness in conducting PSO.  Therefore, during the Cold War’s 
span of nearly 40 years, other countries participated in a wide range of PSO, although not 
specifically addressed within either Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 the UN Charter.  As a result, former 
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold referred to these operations uniquely as “Chapter 6 
½” missions (Moore 1995). 
When the Cold War ended in 1989, the United States had officially participated in two 
UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations—the UN Truce Supervision Organization (1948 to 
present) and the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (1949-1954).  As the Cold 
War bolstered American and Soviet war fighting capabilities, peacekeeping challenges, born 
predominantly from civil wars and ethnic struggles suppressed by the Cold War, supplied a 
greater challenge to the UN and its Member States.  As of September 15, 2001, the UN had 15 
ongoing peacekeeping operations; only 39 had been actually completed since the organization’s 
inception (United Nations DPKO website). 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING 
Under the UN Charter, three principal organs—the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, and the Secretariat—share responsibilities related to PSO.  Although regional 
organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, and other organizations may become involved in PSO, the 
UN Secretariat acts on behalf of the General Assembly and Security Council to develop and 
implement international strategies.  Basically, the Security Council authorizes, the General 
Assembly budgets, and the Secretariat manages PSO-related issues and missions (McClure and 
Orlov 96).  Planning and preparations are multi-dimensional, consisting of diplomatic, economic, 
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humanitarian, and military elements in pursuit of conflict resolution.  After conducting an initial 
assessment of peacekeeping requirements and the overall nature of expected operations, the 
Secretariat determines personnel allocations, equipment, sustainability levels, and functions to be 
performed under the peacekeeping operation.  Unlike a Member State’s government, the UN has 
no armed forces directly under its control, so the Secretariat maintains close contact with 
potential troop-contributing countries to identify those willing to provide troops and equipment 
and to what degree.  In order to allow personnel preparation and training, normally 60 to 90 days, 
potential troop-contributing countries are involved in the earliest stages of the planning process 
(UN CD-ROM).  According to the UN Charter, each member state is responsible for training and 
preparation of its personnel and units designated for PKO to “maintain an attitude of disciplined 
impartiality and professional performance in order to command the respect of conflicting parties” 
(UN CD-ROM).   
As the number of PSO increased following the Cold War, the Secretariat in New York 
possessed little time to focus on training contributing forces for PSO (Findlay 16).  As a result, 
the UN created a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 to administer and 
oversee PSO-related issues.  Subsequently, the DPKO established a Training Unit element in 
1994 to focus on preparing Member States for UN missions.  Previously, some “new” 
peacekeeping nations had partially relied upon so-called veteran peacekeeping countries for 
training.  For example, a Bulgarian battalion received one month of training from the Swedish 
military before to deploying to Cambodia (Findlay 16).   
Based on recommendations from the Brahimi Report, the General Assembly created the 
Training and Evaluation Service (TES) on January 1, 2001 to develop and provide standardized 
UN peacekeeping guidelines and advice through information sharing to Member States.  
Specifically, the Standardization and Evaluation (S&E) section was created under TES to 
provide standard training guidance and advice through the compilation of pre-existing training 
materials, which cover pre-deployment, in-mission orientation, military observers, staff officers, 
and training for soldiers and junior ranks.  Based on a statement by the Secretary General in his 
report regarding implementation of the Brahimi Panel Report recommendations, mission specific 
training cells (TCs) were created, complete with SOPs and tables of organization for subordinate 
elements.  Currently, TCs have been assigned to the UN Transitional Administration in East 
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Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and the UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).   
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING 
Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of TES under the DPKO.  Basically, the 
mission of TES is to coordinate and standardize training among Member States that contribute to 
peacekeeping operations.   
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Figure 2. Organizational Structure of TES under the DPKO. 
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D. MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF TES 
Adapted from the UN website, TES has several core tasks, supplemented with additional 
responsibilities. 
   
1. Core Functions of TES: 
• Collect, analyze, develop, revise and disseminate peacekeeping training material. 
• Provide training advice and assistance to Member States to enhance peacekeeping 
training capacities and to Training Cell in peacekeeping missions to maintain 
peacekeeping operational readiness. 
• Promote UN peacekeeping training standards and guidelines and evaluate 
performance requirements. 
 
2. Additional Responsibilities of TES: 
 
• Share information through UN publications, the web page, correspondence 
courses, seminars, workshops, exercises and the TES News Bulletin. 
• Provide assistance to Member States in organizing, assessing, and conducting 
peace operations training. 
• Provide assistance in the development of qualified trainer cadres; conduct “train 
the trainers” courses 
• Serve as focal point in DPKO peacekeeping operations training. 
• Maintain contact with Permanent Missions to the UN regarding current training 
practices, standards, training policies and materials 
• Liaison with major regional and national peacekeeping training centers and 
encourage the establishment of such centers. 
• Develop, maintain, and distribute guidelines, standards, manuals, and other 
relevant materials. 
• Identify and train United Nations Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs). 
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• Serve as focal point for the African Training Initiative, including maintaining the 
African training database and coordinating donor activities and African training 
needs. 
• Conduct seminars in mission management for senior officials. 
• Conduct staff training courses. 
• Provide pre-deployment training guidance to Member States. 
• Provide support to other DPKO activities, such as promotional briefings, 
workshops, seminars, and conferences. 
• Provide training activity information Member States by maintaining databases for 
peacekeeping training 
 
Although the peacekeeping training centers of Member States may closely align with UN 
guidelines, the UN does not have authority over any training center at the international level.  
Following UN recommendations, the most comprehensive UN-associated training facility is 
located in Niinisalo, Finland to prepare peacekeepers from Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway (Benton 86).  However, monitors from Poland, Switzerland, Austria, and the U.S. have 
also trained at the organization.  Completion of the officers training program takes five weeks, 
while the enlisted program lasts four weeks.  In addition to basic English language training, UN 
Peacekeepers must have at least a fundamental understanding of the specific area of operations 
(AO) to include (Benton 88): 
• History of the region 
• Religions and taboos 
• Sources of conflict; expected duration 
• Status of disputing parties (arms, equipment, ideologies, leaders, etc.) 
 
E. TRAINING CONCEPT 
With respect to national defense of Member States, the UN asserts that countries should 
establish training programs to ensure national defense and security.  If Member States agree to 
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participate in UN-sponsored PSO, Member States and regional organizations are expected to 
conduct pre-deployment training for specific missions and general training in accordance with 
UN guidelines.  Depending upon the assigned mission, Member States may obtain specific pre-
deployment training support from UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTAT).  When units arrive 
in the JOA, these training cells coordinate induction training followed by sustainment exercises 
for the deployment duration.  Instead of providing instruction directly to entire contingents, 
UNTAT members typically serve in a “train the trainer” capacity to improve organizational 
training proficiency.  
The UNTAT system under the DPKO supports peacekeeping training by providing 
guidelines, manuals, and other support materials to training programs of Member States.  
Specifically, the purpose of these teams is “to provide a resource ‘pool’ of peacekeeping training 
teams prepared to readily provide assistance and advice to Member States, on request, in the 
development and implementation of national peacekeeping training programs” (United Nations 
DPKO website).  Rather than employing pre-established teams, the DPKO task organizes a team 
of experts on standby who possess requisite experience and knowledge relative to the mission.  
Based on their prior peacekeeping experience and performance, officers from various Member 
States are selected as UNTAT personnel for a minimum period of two years.  Personnel must 
participate in a comprehensive training seminar prior to being selected as UNTAT 
representatives.  Additionally, UNTAT members must complete a follow-on seminar prior to 
deployment/assignment.  Two seminars are conducted annually to ensure an adequate number of 
trained members.  As a training reference, the Advisor’s Guidebook provides fundamental 
information and directives to enable personnel to provide official, credible, and consistent 
training advice to Member States (United Nations DPKO website).  Each UNTAT member 
should be knowledgeable of the operational principles of peacekeeping that facilitate mission 
success.  Additionally, operating techniques, force composition, planning elements, legal 
concerns, and conduct standards must be understood.  UNTAT members must consider 
peacekeeping operations in multi-dimensional terms, focusing on the relationship between multi-
national military contingents and a broad spectrum of civilian agencies and organizations.  
Coordination among these stakeholders, along with the disputing parties and the local populace, 
must be achieved to bring about a successful mission.  In recent years, the UN has invested 
greater resources to improve communication between military and civilian peacekeeping 
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elements, such as civilian police and humanitarian personnel.  UNTAT members emphasize the 
need to include civilian personnel as both participants and staff members in national training 
programs.    
After UNTAT members are designated for a particular assignment, the team convenes to 
discuss specific requirements.  UNTAT personnel typically respond to training assistance 
requests from Member States, but may be assigned directly by the UN under time constraints or 
critical circumstances.  Teams normally consist of three to six officers with backgrounds in core 
specialties, such as logistics, operations, or communications.   
In general, training provided by UNTAT focuses on promoting training continuity across 
organizations, in addition to mission/induction training.  While mission headquarters are 
responsible for conducting in-theater operations, specialized staff training may be required to 
build organizational cohesion that adequately addresses the multi-dimensional aspects of 
peacekeeping responsibilities.  Depending upon staff member experience, the TES may provide a 
six-day session for key military and civilian personnel assigned to a mission.  Through lectures 
and small group instructional methods, 14 personnel, usually including a former force 
commander, provide four hours of daily training for current staff members.     
Although the UN interacts with training centers worldwide, TES established a 
correspondence course for general training to reach a wider audience.  The UN Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) Program of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping 
Operations (POCI) holds administrative responsibility for managing the course.  Based on its 
mission, the program facilitates standardized training and preparation of personnel from all 
nations.  In fact, the U.S. Army Institute for Professional Development (AIPD) awards Army 
Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) credit hours for completed modules.  Currently, 
correspondence modules are offered in the following areas: 
• Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Methods and Techniques 
for Peacekeeping on the Ground 
• International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict 
• Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution 
• Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations 
28 
• Global Terrorism 
• The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War 
Period: 1945-1987 
• The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following the Cold War 
Period: 1988-1997 
• Peacekeeping in The Former Yugoslavia: From the Dayton Accords to Kosovo 
• Logistical Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
• Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Intermediate 
Logistics Course 
• De-mining in the Aftermath of War: Preventing Casualties to Peacekeepers and 
the Civilian Population 
• Serving as a United Nations Military Observer 
• United Nations Civilian Police: Restoring Order Following Hostilities 
• An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field 
Mission 
• Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers 
• The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations 
 
A current list of available courses can be found at the UNITAR POCI website.  
Ultimately, this self-paced program was designed to promote interoperability and a unity of 
purpose among military officers, civilian employees, and diplomats. 
In April 1995, the DPKO created the Lessons Learned Unit, consisting of eight 
permanent personnel and contracted external consultants, to analyze past peacekeeping efforts to 
help in the planning of future operations and the conduct of ongoing ones (United Nations 
DPKO website).  Lessons learned are developed directly by visiting mission areas to obtain first-
hand information for mid- and end-of-mission assessments.  Additionally, staff personnel utilize 
published materials, media evaluations, independent research, and end-of-tour reports by mission 
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personnel and higher headquarters.  To complete the lessons learned process, personnel 
empirically analyze and evaluate questionnaires completed by former/current mission personnel, 
workshop attendees, and seminar participants.  Then, the Lessons Learned Unit ensures 
accessibility of lessons learned reports in the form of books, documents, and media materials 
from a centralized resource center.  Ultimately, providing easy access to lessons learned ensures 
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IV. REGIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS – 
MODEL OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
The first official military cooperation between the Nordic countries began in 1918, when 
Sweden gave Finland four aircraft to begin its Air Force (Ministry of Defense of Finland Home 
page).  Subsequently, during the initial stages of World War II, Finland, Sweden, and Norway 
began talks to establish a mutual defense alliance.  However, the plan failed based on Soviet 
Union objections compounded with Germany’s occupation of Norway in April 1940.  As the war 
progressed, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland began to assist each other by trading intelligence 
along with personnel and equipment resources.  During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Nordic countries 
first discussed peacekeeping in terms of a UN position.  Beginning in 1963, Finnish 
representatives began working in a civil servant group that planned Nordic cooperation in UN 
peacekeeping matters, especially in the area of training.  In the following year, the Nordiska 
samarbetsgruppen i militära FN-ärenden (NORDSAMFN) espoused and initiated semi-annual 
meetings of the Nordic defense ministers.  As the nature of peacekeeping changed following the 
Cold War, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) formally 
replaced the NORDSAMFN organization in July 1998.  To further institutionalize the role of 
NORDCAPS, a permanent planning body comprised of officer representatives from each Nordic 
country was established on October 1, 2000.  Currently, the ultimate goal of the organization is 
to establish a crisis management contingent by 2003 that can be controlled by either an 
international or regional body, such as the UN, OSCE, EU, or NATO, for peacekeeping 
operations.  The cooperation of Nordic countries has benefited each in terms of consistent 
training programs for personnel, economic cost savings for equipment, and defense 
administration for security planning.  From an altruistic perspective, the Nordic countries view 
peacekeeping operations as “an expression of solidarity with the innocent victims of war” born 
out of a basic desire to provide assistance (Abrahamsen E-mail).  Further, Nordic international 
security policies that were very restricted during the Cold War have loosened over the last 
decade.   
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B. OVERVIEW OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING 
The Nordic countries approach peacekeeping from a traditional perspective, focusing on 
the following requirements3:  1) consent of the disputing parties, 2) neutrality and impartiality of 
military peacekeepers, and 3) a strictly defensive use of weapons.  Further, peacekeepers are 
viewed as neutral observers, who neither act as combatants nor take part in hostilities.  In order 
to remain impartial, peacekeepers rely on negotiation and mediation skills to achieve compliance 
when violations occur.  If violations of the UN mandate occur, personnel immediately notify 
higher headquarters (Potgieter  and Gamba 1996). 
While the use of force should serve only as a last resort, the Nordic approach does 
support an explicit show of force, defined as “the use of impressive-looking equipment, vehicles, 
weapons and well-disciplined units with smart appearance”4.  Consequently, the Nordic 
approach contends that an impressive show of force serves as an effective deterrent to conflict 
escalation.  In summary, the Nordic countries view peacekeeping as incompatible and 
completely distinct from peace enforcement operations. 
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING 
The NORDCAPS organization establishes Nordic multi-national contingencies to support 
either NATO or EU forces in PSO mandated by the UN.  All Nordic countries, consisting of 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, designate land, naval, and air forces towards a Nordic 
Pool of Forces Register (NPFR).  Currently, NORDCAPS plans to develop an exclusive, 
brigade-sized land force for PSO deployments by July 1, 2003.  Tentatively, the unit will consist 
of four national battalions, while the headquarters unit, combat support, and service support units 
will be multinational.  Eventually, Nordic naval and air force units specialized for PSO will be 
established.  To meet the objective of having a Nordic PSO contingent, extensive coordination 
occurs between individuals and organizations at the following levels: 
• Defense Ministers from all four countries meet twice a year to discuss strategic 
issues.  Preliminary meetings often occur at the department head level. 
                                                 
3 Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN), Nordic UN Tactical Manual 
4 Ibid. 
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• The NORDCAPS Steering Group (NSG) consists of senior-level civil 
servants/Ministers of Defense (MOD) supported by high-ranking military officer 
(general officers level). 
• The NORDCAPS Military Coordination Group (NMCG) conducts day-to-day 
business of the organization.  Officers from the Defense Headquarters of each 
nation comprise the group, which meets every other month. 
• The NORDCAPS Planning Element (PLE) consists of full-time officers from 
each Nordic country who function as a “secretariat” for the NMCG.  The PLE 
focuses on knowledge management within the institution by preparing meeting 
agendas and maintaining all relevant documents. 
• Working Groups (WG) are comprised of specialists who focus on various issues, 
such as logistics, combat support, and training. 




























Figure 3. Organizational Structure of NORDCAPS 
 
 
With respect to PSO training, the NORDCAPS Working Group Course Directors 
(NWG/CD) are authorized to plan and conduct courses based on the following tasks: 
1. Produce the course catalog to include: 
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a. A time schedule for conducting courses. 
b. Student seats available. 
c. Distribution and assignment of instructors. 
d. Fact finding for documentation. 
e. Planning instructor meetings. 
2. Conduct the courses. 
3. Improve and develop the courses to prepare students for participation in UN, OSCE, 
NATO, or EU operations. 
4. Make suggestions for establishing new courses. 
5. Conduct an annual “Official Visitors Day” for flag officers representing their respective 
countries.  The event location will rotate based on the following cycle:  Sweden-2002, 
Norway-2003, Denmark-2004, Finland-2005, etc. 
6. Exchange information with other organizations involved with PSO training. 
7. Report to the NMCG about initiatives undertaken and decisions made by the group 
(responsibility of the chairman).  
NWG/CD members continue to work under the guidance of their respective militaries.  
Course directors from the various NORDCAPS courses comprise the working group, while each 
nation appoints a Senior Course Director (SCD).  All decisions result from consensus among the 
member nation representatives.  The Chairman of Training and Exercise Matters of the PLE 
(CJ7/PLE) serves as an observer for all course director conferences.  Based on two annual course 
directors conferences, the location of meetings rotates among the Nordic country members in the 
following cycle:  Norway-2002, Finland-2003, Sweden-2004, Denmark-2005, etc.  
Chairmanship of the meeting will be the responsibility of the host nation.    
When the Nordic countries receive a request for a PSO contingent, a Nordic Coordination 
Group (NCG) is established.  Comprised of representatives from all of the Nordic countries, this 
group coordinates the preparatory and deployment phases of the mission by responding to 
concerns from individual countries and addressing general concerns to all.  Upon deployment of 
the contingent, authority is transferred to an allied higher force commander.  Since tensions may 
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occur between the allied commander and subordinate leaders, the NCG remains in theater to 
address such issues.  Upon mission completion, the NCG coordinates redeployment, as 
operational control (OPCON) remains with the CHOD (Chief of Defense)/MOD during both 
deployment and redeployment of troops. 
 
D. MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING 
WITHIN NORDCAPS 
Although every Nordic country conducts PSO training, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
have specialized centers designed for PSO training.  These organizations are the Finnish Defense 
Forces International Center (FINCENT), the Norway Defense Forces International Center 
(NODEFIC), and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (SWEDINT).  On the contrary, 
Denmark utilizes existing institutions to complete training.  Although these centers focus 
predominantly on PSO theory, other training areas, such as map reading skills, command post 
exercises (CPX), and combined arms exercises (CAX), are addressed as well.  In addition to unit 
preparations for army battalion, naval task force, and air task force operations, basic military 
skill development and language training for individuals are national responsibilities.  For multi-
national contingents assigned to PSO, each Nordic country maintains responsibility for training 
in designated areas as depicted in Figure 4.  In general, Finland provides training for military 
observers, Sweden for staff officers, Norway for transport and logistics officers, and Denmark 
for military police (Ministry of Defense of Finland Home page).  
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While complete course descriptions can be obtained from the United Nations Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations website, the Nordic countries will provide the following courses for 
PSO training in 2002: 
Norway 
International Commanding Officers Course (INTCOC) 
International Senior Logistic Officers Course (INTSLOC) 
International Support Staff Officers Course (INTSUPSOC)  
United Nation Logistics Officers Course (UNLOC) 
NATO/Partnership for Peace Logistics Officers Course (NATO/PFPLOC) 
Finland 
United Nations Military Observers Course (UNMOC)  
International Communication and Information Systems Course (INTCIS) 
OCSE & European Union Monitors and Observers Course (OCSE/EUMOC) 
Engineering and Mine-clearing (EOD) 
Sweden 
United Nations Staff Officers Course (UNSOC) 
Partnership for Peace Staff Officers Course (PFPSOC) 
Partnership for Peace Junior Staff Officers Course (PFPJSOC) 
United Nations Junior Officers Course (UNJOC) 
International course for Press and Information Officers (PIO) 
Denmark 
Nordic United Nations Military Police Course (UNMILPOC) 





Figure 4. Nordic PSO Training Responsibilities 
 
Course directors from each of the Nordic countries meet at least twice each year to 
establish curriculums two years in advance.  They discuss the number of Nordic country 
applicants allocated to each course, while determining space available for foreign students who 
represent Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.  Occasionally, course directors attend the other 
Nordic programs to coordinate teaching techniques.        
 
E. TRAINING CONCEPT 
With respect to each of the Nordic countries, military preparations for a UN mission 
conclude with approximately three months of mission-specific training.  Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark all utilize a conscription system to meet manpower requirements; 
however, a cadre of professional officers leads troop contingents.  While contingents receive a 
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preponderance of training within their respective militaries, the multinational commander of a 
land brigade, sea task force, or air task force coordinates training requirements through the NCG. 
At the NORDCAPS organizational level, joint exercises entitled “Nordic Peace” began in 
1997 to develop mutual understanding and cooperation between the Nordic countries in peace 
operations (“NORDCAPS-Nordic Co-operation in Peace Operations” Online posting).  To 
promote Partnership for Peace objectives within the NORDCAPS framework, these exercises 
emphasize cooperation between the military and civil authorities in international operations.  
Additionally, the training focuses on command and control, communication systems, procedures, 
and closer cooperation among leaders.  For “Nordic Peace 2000” exercises, military personnel 
from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with several non-military groups, joined the 
NORDCAPS countries to expand training. 
 
F. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
Currently, the NORDCAPS organization does not utilize training standards within its 
various programs.  However, with respect to land forces, the program intends to have such 
standards incorporated between the end of 2002 and summer of 2003.  Looking towards the 




V. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:  
MODEL OF THE CANADIAN FORCES 
A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
The history of Canada’s military participation in PSO, which reaches back to service in 
Kashmir between 1949 and 1979, has greatly influenced the evolution of personnel training and 
preparation.  Actually, Canada regards its military participation in PSO as a proud legacy; 
however, Canadian military officials are quick to emphasize its traditional involvement in major 
wars, citing 1,600 casualties in the Korean Conflict.5 While typical military functions center on 
national security and homeland protection, the motivations behind Canada’s PSO heritage are 
intriguing.  As a veteran peacekeeper country, the altruistic nature of PSO, especially during the 
early years of only sparse operations, is often cited as a driving force behind policy.  However, 
given a dramatic increase in UN-sponsored missions, the national prestige and respect achieved 
through PSO participation serve as modern motivators (Findlay 7-8).   In turn, Canadian society 
has generally come to accept the relevancy of PSO in the international arena. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION TRAINING 
From a Canadian perspective, the nature of PSO has changed from traditional 
peacekeeping missions, such as manning outposts on well-known boundaries in Cyprus, to more 
complex missions, exemplified in the Somalia Mission of 1993.  In addition to the loss of 18 
U.S. Army soldiers in Somalia, the deadly force used by Canadian soldiers on a Somali citizen 
compelled the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (DCDS) to order an examination of current 
training methods used for PSO.  While this study revealed the overall efficiency of personnel in 
traditional military roles, shortcomings in PSO were blamed on a training program that lacked 
consistency and depth.  Some areas of concern were negotiation skills, culture and language 
familiarity, and the application of Rules of Engagement (ROE).  The overall findings revealed 
the need for more consistent and thorough PSO training through an institutionalized program. 
                                                 
5 Available [Online]: < http://www.dnd.ca/menu/legacy/history_e.htm 
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
TRAINING  
In response to the DCDS study, two primary centers were established in the mid-1990s 
for peace training.  The Lester B. Pearson Peace Center (PPC) opened in 1995 “to support and 
enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability through the 
provision of quality research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.”6 While the 
PPC provides primarily strategic and operational level training to both military personnel and 
civilians, the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC), which opened in 1996, focuses on the 
tactical training for the Canadian Military.  Located several miles from the Royal Military 
College (RMC), the PSTC is part of the Canadian Forces Base, Kingston, Ontario. 
 
D. MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER 
Since the mission of any organization is critical for determining training needs, the Land 
Force Command (LFC) Implementation Directive of May 28, 1996, prescribed the desired end 
state for the PSTC: 
“To provide a nucleus of expertise within the Canadian Forces (CF) responsible 
for the development of peace support techniques based on lessons learned, 
training methodology, training standards and the provision of training and training 
support.”7 
Subsequently, five tasks were assigned to accomplish this mission: 
1. Training prospective PSO personnel 
2. Providing training assistance to Canadian contingents/departments and ally nations 
3. Completing in theater evaluation and validation of actual instruction given at the 
institution 
4. Developing peace support operations training standards and SOPs 
5. Maintaining a close liaison with other peace-related organizations     
A critical element of the PSTC training model is the training feedback loop, comprised of 
the following evaluation and validation techniques: 
                                                 
6 Available [Online]: < http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/About/Mission.htm 
7 Ibid. 
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1. Evaluation:  student questionnaires, end of course debrief, staff After Action Reports 
(AAR), and End of Course Report (ECR) 
2. Validation:  travel to theatre (observation of effectiveness), on-the-job questionnaires, 
supervisor questionnaires, and discussion/focus groups. 
The criteria used by PSTC staff to evaluate training success extend beyond classroom 
instruction into the actual operational environment.  Also, trainers realize that not all skills will 
be applied during every peacekeeping deployment.  Thus, building personnel confidence through 
constant preparation proves critical when unique challenges do arise.  While the relevance of 
these measures is undoubted, further research must be completed with respect to their reliability 
and freedom from bias. 
To stress the importance of PSO within Canada’s military strategy, all military personnel, 
regardless of rank or specialty, are required to complete one-week of PSO-specific training.  
Prior to deployment, personnel either attend the PSTC basic course or receive equivalent unit 
training at their commands.  Just as the United States Marine Corps (USMC) utilizes The Basic 
School (TBS) to train all lieutenants prior to entering the “fleet,” Canada provides mission-
specific training at either the unit level at home bases or for individuals at the PSTC.  
Additionally, the PSTC offers a nineteen-day onsite course for personnel assigned to military 
observers missions.  This course covers significantly more detailed information than the basic 
course.  Canada does not use conscription to meet manpower requirements, but focuses on 
training and maintaining a professional force. 
 
E. PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER COMMAND AND CONTROL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Within the Canadian Forces command and control structure, the PSTC is subordinate to 
the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) of the Land Element as depicted in 
Figure 5.  Actually, the PSTC occupies the first floor of a building shared with the LFDTS.  Due 
to the joint nature of training personnel from the land, sea, and air military elements, the PSTC 




Figure 5. Canadian Forces Command Structure 
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The organizational structure (Appendix A) of the PSTC is differentiated into four 
sections: 
1. Headquarters Element 
2. Training Support 
3. Training 
4. Standards Section 
The Headquarters element maintains responsibility for administration of the center, while 
the commandant leads the organization.  The Training Section provides onsite instruction at the 
PSTC, while Training Assistance Teams conduct mobile courses for units throughout Canada.  
Training teams are comprised of one officer from any military element and a combat arms 
warrant officer.  Additionally, the Training Support Section ensures that all necessary 
educational aides and materials are available.  Finally, the Standards Cell oversees the evaluation 
of training by both students and instructors, culminating with the validation of training within the 
actual area of operations.  Also, this section develops training materials and course 
documentation.  For example, a Peace Support Operations Field Book is distributed to each 
student who participates in PSO training. 
 
F. TRAINING CONCEPT 
The Canadian training model for PSO utilized by the PSTC focuses on three primary 
elements.  The first component concentrates on occupational skills required for assigned 
occupational specialties (i.e. U.S. Navy rate), while combat training and physical stamina 
comprise the second.  For PSO, the building blocks of training, such as mission-specific 
knowledge and comprehension of ROE, represent the most critical facets of developing 
situational awareness and force protection.  Similar to U.S. Army training for PSO, the Canadian 
military has devised a training progression schedule that covers a 90-day time period, beginning 
and ending with “No-Go” and “Go” measures respectively (Figure 6). 8 
                                                 


















Figure 6. Training Timeline for Canadian Forces Deploying for Peace Support Operations 
 
G. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
While courses at the PSTC cover a wide range of both individual and unit training needs, 
individual skill requirements for PSO receive utmost attention.  Basic military skills are 
complemented with PSO-specific training in the following areas: 
1. History and fundamentals of PSO 
2. Specific mission concerns for current operations (i.e. geography, mission operations and 
intelligence) 




Individual Training:  Stage 2 (Additional Skills for 
PSO) 
Individual Training:  Stage 1 (Basic Military Skills) 
Unit/Group Training: 
•Battle Inoculation Training 
•Validation Exercise 
•Unit Collective Training 
•Sub-unit Collective Training 
Individual Service Members 
Deployable Contingents/Groups 
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4. Mine awareness 
5. Hostage survival skills 
6. Negotiation and mediation 
7. Preventive medicine 
8. Media awareness 
9. Equipment recognition of weapons systems 
10. Stress management 
11. Application of force and ROE understanding 
12. Cross cultural awareness 
13. Legal Issues and personal conduct 
14. Administration, allowances, and benefits 
The schedule in Appendix B. identifies the Canadian Forces training standard (i.e. 
402.01), course title, instructor (not cited), and room assignment for each area of training.  Per 
Table 1, the center maintains an environment conducive to PSO training by dedicating rooms 
according to geographic location of the mission.  For example, the schedule below outlines 
training for personnel deploying to either the Golan Heights (Operation DANACA) or Egypt 
(Operation CALUMET).  Throughout the hallways and classrooms of the PSTC, mine displays, 
historical information, and commemorative displays to Canadian PSO military casualties imbue 




Table 1.   Room Assignments for Mission Area Training 
 
 
H. STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
While the training teams of the PSTC focus on unit training within the Canadian Forces, 
some individuals serving in unique military or in a reserve capacity may require onsite training at 
the PSTC.  Although a random sample of military personnel who received PSO training could 
not be obtained, demographic characteristics for 717 service members who attended the PSTC 
Basic Course are provided in Appendix C.  Between January 16, 2001 and November 29, 2001, 
the PSTC conducted 26 segments of the Basic Course, consisting of 20 to 40 attendees per 
segment.  By mandate of the DCDS, the PSTC is tasked and funded to provide a total of 28 basic 
courses and four observer courses annually.  In total, approximately 5000 Canadian military 
personnel are trained either onsite at the PSTC or by mobile training assistance teams per year.  
Since training program developers must tailor their curricula to both mission 
requirements and student characteristics, demographics for students attending the onsite PSTC 
basic course provide valuable insight into model development.  When assessing the needs for a 
PSO training model, participant ages, military service time, rank/grade, gender, marital status, 
education level, regular/reserve status, service branch (element), and, most importantly, prior 
PSO experience must be considerations for the training program.  Among valid responses from 
717 students who attended basic courses from January 16, 2001 to November 29, 2001, the 
average student was approximately 37 years of age, with nearly 16 years of military service.  
Further, the course consisted of 82% males, and 84% of students served in the regular 
component of the Canadian Forces.  As expected, a preponderance of students (63.4%) was part 
of the “Land Element” (Army), 26.1% hailed from the “Air Element” (Air Force), while the 
remaining 10.5% had a “Sea Element” (Navy) background.  However, out of 717 attendees, 
nearly 30% of attendees did not provide an element/branch of service, which could indicate the 
Room Assignment Region/Area Mission Location Students
102 South East Asia OP DANACA Golan Heights 24 
104 Far East OP CALUMET Egypt 1 
105 Cyprus 
106 Central America 
108 Central Africa 
110 North Africa 
112 Balkans 
114 Middle East 




“joint” nature of many administrative billet assignments.  Approximately 15% of students at the 
PSTC course had received previous training onsite.  Appendix C. contains further statistics 
concerning the ranks, marital status, education, years of service, and prior PSO experience of 
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VI. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:  
MODEL OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES 
A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Following its official national reunification on October 3, 1990, Germany has taken part 
in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), including PSO, in terms of economic, 
material, and personnel support (Eyth 7).  Basically, the German Government shifted its focus 
away from domestic concerns towards projecting national sovereignty and importance within the 
international arena (Bauer 1997).  PSO participation represents an altruistic means for Germany 
to bolster its political and military status without investing substantial resources or assuming an 
aggressive posture.  For example, the following timeline demonstrates some of Germany’s 
contributions to either UN or NATO missions since its reunification (Eyth 7): 
• May 1992-November 1993:  150 medical personnel deployed to Cambodia to 
establish a field hospital in support of the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
• July 1994-December 1994:  One B-707 and two C-160 transport aircraft along 
with 30 airmen provide logistical support for the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
• August 1992-March 1993 (Army); August 1993-March 1994 (airlift):  
Approximately 1700 troops, 120 airmen, 600 sailors, and requisite logistical 
assets support UN troops and conduct Mombasa – Somalia airlift operations for 
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) 
• August-December 1995:  Germany contributes personnel to a Franco-German 
Rapid Reaction Force (two brigades) tasked to ensure freedom of mobility to the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
• December 1996-Present:  1800 personnel deploy to the SFOR in Bosnia, marking 
the first deployment of troops directly into the area of operations for a crisis 
• June 1999-Present:  Nearly 5000 personnel assigned to KFOR to establish 
security for the Southern zone within the Province of Kosovo 
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• August 2001-Present:  500 personnel participate in NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest to expedite the turnover of arms belonging to Albanian rebels in 
Macedonia.  Further, 600 soldiers are being assigned to protect EU and OSCE 
observers for the follow-on Operation Amber Fox 
• November 2001:  Germany pledges 3900 military personnel to the U.S.-led War 
on Terrorism, including 100 Special Forces commandos  
 
B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING 
In response to military experiences in UNOSOM II, the German government decided in 
1993 that a central peacekeeping training center was required to enhance future preparations for 
such missions.  Specifically, the organization should focus on developing expertise in assessing 
future mission requirements.  On August 25, 1994, the Army Chief of Staff tasked the infantry 
school in Hammelburg to design and implement a peacekeeping school.  Under guidance from 
the United Nations, the UN Training Center of the German Armed Forces officially opened on 
October 27, 1999.  In contrast to the U.S. Army and Canadian Forces training programs, the 
overall function of the German school is to train both military personnel and civilian officials for 
peacekeeping operations.  In fact, nearly 54,000 soldiers and civilian personnel combined have 
been successfully trained from the organization’s inception through the year 2000 (Greb E-mail). 
In a February 2002 speech, Colonel Hans-Jürgen Folkerts of the PSO Training Center 
stated that the German Armed Forces, especially the German Army, intends to modify both 
commander and unit training to meet current operational requirements.  Traditionally, military 
training has emphasized combined arms combat, while secondary emphasis has been given to 
preparing contingents for UN missions or NATO missions under a UN mandate.  Since these 
missions were considered an exception to the rule, training programs did not thoroughly 
integrated related topics within their curricula.  Colonel Folkerts recognizes the irony in 
deploying officer candidates who recently completed combined arms training to the Balkans in 
support of a peace support operation.  Therefore, staff members of the German UN Training 
Center contend that PSO training, generally categorized as Operations Other Than War 
(OOTW), must be a compulsory component in the training of commanders and units.  Further, 
contingents training should be mission-specific, while PSO/OOTW training should be instituted 
on a universal basis.   
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With respect to future basic and advanced training for infantry commanders and leaders, 
fundamental elements of mission training in the extended range of tasks (ERT), including 
PSO/Stability and Support Operations, should be taught as course-related regular training for all 
officers and NCOs of the German Army.  As a result, incremental school training enables 
officers and NCOs to serve in commanding/staff functions during support and stability 
operations.  Such training facilitates progressive leader development through course 
advancement.  Ultimately, the ERT training should be adapted for and integrated into all 
command courses at the appropriate level.   
The German Heeresamt, the Ministry of Defense, and the Army Staff generally agree 
with the integration of support and stability operations training, including PSO, into the course 
curriculum.  However, officials disagree over the proportion of ERT training relative to 
traditional war fighting skill development, especially within the Officer Candidates’ Course.  
Most concur that ERT training should occur prior to completing university studies, since some 
officers may not attend a university or may fail to complete their university education. 
Regarding PSO course duration at the German UN Training Center, the current course 
objectives and those associated with ERT cannot be achieved without expanding and 
diversifying the course curriculum.  Accordingly, the proportion and magnitude of general 
military training elements, such as physical fitness preparations, may need to be reduced relative 
to increases in PSO training.  Further, certain training subjects, notably the role of military 
law/legal implications for support and stability operations, may need to be re-evaluated as well. 
Following initial PSO training in conjunction with combat arms training, officer 
candidates do not receive follow-on instruction, unless assigned to a crisis reaction unit.  
Therefore, the German UN Training Center contends that branch-specific components of both 
the officer candidates training and the advanced NCO training programs should receive 
additional PSO instruction.  As a result, these curricular enhancements should ensure 
comprehensive training for future commanders and leaders at the onset of initial training. 
In February of 2002, Colonel Folkerts of the German Peace Training Center chaired a 
working group for a recently-developed Training and Education for Peace Support Operations 
(TEPSO) program.  At this meeting, representatives from NATO and PfP countries presented 
information regarding their respective training programs.  Relevant to this research, Canada, 
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Germany, and the Nordic Countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were all 
represented at the meeting, while the United States did not attend.  United Nations 
representatives plan to be present at the next conference to provide guidance.   
The overall goal of TEPSO is to achieve harmonization and standardization of PSO 
training among participating nations.  Specifically, the TEPSO working group aims to maximize 
multi-national interoperability by recommending objectives for PSO education and training.  The 
group addressed the following questions: 
• Which basic documents are used in PSO training? 
• Which Rules of Engagement (ROE) are used in PSO training? 
• How is PSO training organized?   
• What are the key training areas in national programs?   
The findings of this initial session will be further evaluated prior to commencing a follow-on 
meeting in the fall of 2002 (Williams E-mail).  Ultimately, by focusing on a diverse cohort of 
PfP and NATO countries, the TEPSO program has tremendous potential for advancing and 
standardizing future training.  
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING IN THE GERMAN 
MILITARY 
Currently, PSO training in the Germany Military remains theater-specific, rather than 
being collectively embraced in all training programs.  Therefore, examining the overall training 
plan for the KFOR Task Force, German soldiers initially receive traditional military skills in 
conjunction with a PSO skill foundation at the division level.  Teams comprised of experienced 
PSO personnel deploy from the Peace Training Center to support unit preparations in garrison.  
They utilize a “teaching and coaching” strategy, which focuses on achieving common goals 
through a spirit of cooperation (Greb E-mail).  By maintaining open dialogue among all 
participants, viable solutions can often be determined for challenging situations.  Unit training at 
the division level focuses on basic combat skills and the following complementary training areas: 
• Civic education and leadership development 
• Combat/marksmanship training 
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• Protection (general) 
• Mine awareness 
• Essential area protection 
• Checkpoint control 
• Patrolling techniques 
• Driving skills 
• Security procedures 
• Medical, engineering, communications basic knowledge 
• Military police duties 
Thereafter, units complete an intensive fourteen-day course at the PSO training center in 
Hammelburg.  As discussed more fully in the succeeding section, the PSO course focuses on the 
following areas: 
• Basic organization of the task force 
• Missions types: 
o Patrolling 
o Headquarters/command post fundamentals 
• Integration of air transportation, counter-insurgency operations, and military 
police duties 
For missions requiring special training, such as advanced armory techniques for KFOR, 
personnel transfer to specialty schools to complete preparations.  For example, prior to deploying 
for Kosovo, personnel who specialize in armor receive the following instruction at the Armor 
School in Munster: 
• Field firing (section/platoon level) 
• Field firing (reinforced platoon) 
• Command post exercises 
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• Integration training at the company team level   
Specialized school training at the unit level typically concludes pre-deployment training 
for most units. 
Per Figure 7, the organizational structure of the German UN Training Center closely 
follows the conceptual framework for training.  To support the training center staff of 21 
officers, 22 petty officers, 3 enlisted, and a civilian psychologist, experienced media and press 
personnel are employed from the Department of Defense information military staff, in addition 
to civilian press teams that advise the military in public affairs techniques.  SME and prominent 
guest speakers from universities are frequently invited to the center for special briefings on 
unique areas of concern.  For example, in the wake of military operations in Afghanistan during 
2001, the training center requested several guest speakers to educate staff personnel and 




Figure 7. Organizational Structure of the German UN Training Center 
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Officers:  21 
NCO:  22 
Enlisted:  3 
Civilian Psychologists:  1 
Principles & Policy Section 
Officers:  1 
NCO:  1 
Enlisted:  1 
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D. TRAINING CONCEPT 
Since the training program at the German UN Training Center in Hammelburg trains both 
military and civilian personnel, three training areas have been established to meet diverse and 
ever-changing requirements.  Per Figure 7, UN representatives work closely with German 
officials to maintain organizational control, primarily in the form of concept development and 
guidance.    
Training Component 1 conducts courses involving international cooperation and support.  
Specifically, personnel assigned to military observer courses must attend the UNMOC as a 
prerequisite for deployment.  By July of 2001, the UNMOC had trained 813 participants from 49 
countries.  Initially, the program focused on training only “leaders”; however, its scope has been 
significantly expanded to encompass a wider audience.  Interestingly, special courses catered to 
civilians, such as journalists and humanitarian relief workers, provide instruction on personal 
security and the role of relief organizations.  Essentially, these courses were offered to reduce the 
rift between the media and military organizations by emphasizing commonalities and 
cooperation. 
Training Component 2 emphasizes unit level training, specifically focusing on current 
missions such as KFOR, SFOR, Task Force (TF) FOX, and the Civil-Military Task Force 
(CMTF).  As required by the mission, individuals with unique military specialties augment 
baseline units to form an enhanced lead division, which will unilaterally deploy to the mission 
area.  For requisite training, soldiers are taught how to integrate and function within the 
Partnership for Peace Program of NATO.  Camaraderie and teamwork are highlighted as groups 
work together to overcome challenges in role-playing scenarios that reflect a dynamic and 
unpredictable environment.  As a result, the training program is constantly updated and adapted 
to real world changes with respect to the mission areas.  Feedback from deployed personnel 
plays an important part in shaping the training regimen. 
Training Component 3 originated as a team of experts in force protection that expanded 
in October 1998 into a course covering convoy, area, object, and personnel protection.  For 
example, students learn about the employment of explosives sniffing dogs within the mission 
area.  Advisor teams play a key role in consulting and preparing troops on an individual level. 
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To supplement onsite training at the German UN Training Center, staff members have 
developed a multimedia CD-ROM to provide participants with additional resources and 
information.  While this media provides general PSO information, mission-specific operating 
procedures and data for current deployments are provided as well.  For example, the KFOR 
contingent, which supports the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
receives information in the following areas: 
• Symbols of military units common within the area of operations 
• Identification card types of various organizations 
• Briefings on history, geography, culture, and other aspects of the mission area 
• Force protection measures, such as dress code and threat conditions/alert states 
• Report formats commonly required for incidents (i.e. military police records) 
• Pictures of uniforms and equipment common to the area 
Likewise, the training CD-ROM provides personnel involved in SFOR (contingent to 
Bosnia) with comparable information.  
Other subjects covered extensively on the CD-ROM media include the following: 
• Standard Operating Procedures, such as instructions for protecting spaces, objects, 
convoys, and entrusted persons 
• Mine awareness information with pictures, explicit photographs, presentations, 
SOPS, and related websites 
• Photos and video clips of mission areas, equipment, and scenario demonstrations 
• Points of contact for UN Training Center staff members 
Of great importance, the training CD-ROM includes a detailed appendix of all articles, 
pictures, presentations, videos, and even MP3 music files for the entire media production. 
 
E. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
Skill requirements and associated training needs are aligned with current trends in PSO 
mission areas.  With respect to the ROE for specific deployments, the Zentrale 
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Truppenausbildung (ZENTRA) for centralized troop training and the Einsatzverbandsausbildung 
(EVA) for unit mission training are closely adapted to mission requirements.   
At the Peace Training Center, evaluations/examinations of student performance are not 
formally conducted.  If an instructor discerns performance weaknesses among participants, those 
areas are remedied through additional instruction, while contingent leaders are notified of the 
shortcomings.  At this time, individual training standards have not been developed for courses 
provided at the training center.  
The German Military differentiates PSO training requirements at the officer and NCO 
rank levels.  Per Figure 8, officer training focuses at the beginning and intermediate experience 
levels.  To meet increased PSO training requirements for officer candidates, training hours may 
be extended, general military training may be shortened, and special training activities 
incorporated.  On the contrary, Figure 9 demonstrates the permeation of PSO training throughout 
all NCO rank levels.  Reflecting on Colonel Folkers’ speech, a disparity exists between officer 
training and that of NCO. 
Currently, the German Army continues to integrate training for support and stability 
operations, including PSO, with relative success.  However, program developers still seek a 
homogenous training approach that unifies fundamental requirements for all military branches 
involved in operations within the ERT.  This requirement extends beyond the infantry to include 
other combat arms units and those assigned to combat service support organizations and 
secondary roles.  Further, the timeline for ERT training requirements must be considered within 
the overall curricular framework for both officers and NCO.   
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Figure 8. German UN Training Center Officer Training Program 
 
Figure 9. German UN Training Center NCO Training Program 
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VII. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:  
MODEL OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Although somewhat transfixed during the Cold War, U.S. Military forces, principally the 
U.S. Army, have participated in various PSO since 1948.  For example, soldiers served as 
members of a multinational force and observers (MFO) group in the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization in the Middle East, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), 
and the Sinai (since 1982) (FM 100-23).  Recently, President George W. Bush requested the 
continued support of Congress in the deployment of troops to the NATO-led international 
security force in Kosovo (KFOR) and to other areas pertinent to that mission (Bush 2001).  As of 
May 18, 2001, approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel were contributed to KFOR, while an 
additional 500 personnel supported operations in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece.  In terms of 
former President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), current polices reiterate 
the initiative that “peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests 
and pursue our national security objectives.” (Clinton 1994)   
 
B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING 
While all U.S. Military Services have participated in various PSO, the levels, types, and 
extent of training programs vary significantly across branches.  In comparison to the Canadian 
model of a joint training center, the U.S. Military utilizes decentralized and intra-service training 
to prepare for PSO.  At the War College for each service, UN strategic concepts and force 
deployment are taught to field grade officers.  In the U.S. Army, a select group of junior grade 
officers receive PSO-specific training at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, while advanced infantry and armor courses may incorporate scenario-
driven MOOTW training (Becker A6+).  In the United States Marine Corps, all company grade 
officers (lieutenants and captains) are required to complete two phases of an Amphibious 
Warfare School (AWS) military education course.  However, out of approximately 324 hours 
prescribed for the course, only 16 hours or 5% are designated for studying Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW).  Further, PSO are not referenced in the accompanying handbook 
that familiarizes officers with other MOOTW, such as counter-drug operations and combating 
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terrorism.  Regarding enlisted personnel, they do not receive specific PSO training in their 
professional military education (PME) unless assigned to a unit deploying for such operations.   
PSO most directly involve military ground forces, leaving naval and air components to 
function primarily in support roles.  While the United States Marine Corps has earned the 
reputation as “first to fight” in combat operations, formal PSO training in a school environment 
is virtually non-existent in the Corps (Thomas Interview).  Therefore, among the military 
branches, both active duty and reserve U.S. Army units receive most mission assignments for 
PSO, especially those of a long-standing nature.  Additionally, National Guard units have been 
assigned to peacekeeping operations in recent years.  As a result, the Army possesses the most 
advanced doctrine and associated training programs for PSO.  This chapter begins with a general 
discussion of PSO fundamentals within the U.S. Military, followed by a discussion of the 
Army’s model and training strategies for PSO.     
Despite different PSO training programs across the U.S. Military, the Joint Warfare 
Center Handbook provides some general guidelines for commanders to consider when 
conducting training.  Pre-deployment training should be designed upon completion of a thorough 
mission assessment with respect to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) (JWC XI-1).  Upon 
deployment to the JOA, training must be continuous at both the individual and unit levels.  Also, 
training for PSO does not vary significantly from war fighting training, except for an expanded 
and enhanced personnel skill set (JWC XI-1).  These skills can be further developed by focusing 
on the following training areas (JWC XI-1): 
1. Individual military skills 
2. Ind. And collective preventive medicine procedures and practice 
3. First Aid-Individual and “buddy” 
4. Terrorism awareness and prevention 
5. Unit training (mandatory rehearsals)-based on projected operations 
6. Staff training to include training with multi-national and nonmilitary organizations; as the 
number of multinational forces and non-military organizations increase, team building 
will be critical 
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7. Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, economic, and 
historical background of the situation and populations of the JOA 
8. Adversary capabilities 
9. How to communicate with the populace via the news media-public information 
10. Negotiation and mediation 
11. Language training (key phrases at a minimum) 
12. Situational Awareness 
• Mine & booby trap awareness 
• Recognition of weapons and associated systems 
13. ROE (to include both Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, 
“Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces,” and additional measures specific to the 
operation 
14.  Law of War (law of armed conflict) 
15.  Crowd Control-use and employment of riot control agents 
Although training areas are presented above, the manual does not prescribe specific skill 
sets with standardized learning objectives.  In broad terms, pre-deployment training should 
encompass all elements of the contingent force, to include the training of Naval Forces aboard 
ships.  These personnel should be brought ashore to receive individual skill training, ROE 
instruction, guidance on media relations, and situational/cultural awareness of the JOA (Joint 
Warfighting Center (JWC) XI-1).  Non-military organizations, such as NGOs and Private 
Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), should be allowed to participate in training exercises.  
Additional training requirements may include the following (JWC XI-3): 
64 
1. Proper personal conduct 
2. All military personnel, especially junior officers, SNCOs, and NCOs receive instruction 
on PSO fundamentals 
3. Review the supported combatant commander’s JMETL for guidance on military force 
capability as it relates to training requirements 
4. Train those to whom you lend equipment 
5. Consulting other organizations and sources for training 
 
“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a 
peacekeeping force.”—Lieutenant General T. Montgomery, USA, Senior Military 
Representative to NATO 
Affirmed in the above quote, Field Manual 100-23 on Peace Operations asserts that 
essential combat and basic soldier skills form the foundation for conducting peace operations.  
However, within this 131-page manual, only one paragraph of the main body is devoted to force 
training; an appendix on training accounts for four additional pages.  The reference contends that 
leaders will be imparted with the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes from schools, while 
unique aspects of peace operations should be addressed in pre-deployment training with 
assistance from mobile training teams (MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and, if time 
allows, training at combat training centers (CTCs).  Despite alluding to several sources of 
training guidance, the manual states, “Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be 
treated as a separate task to be added to a unit’s mission-essential task list (METL).  
Paradoxically, although peace operations tasks may deviate significantly from warfighting skills, 
training “can be summed up as just enough and just in time” as stated in the manual. 
FM 100-23 emphasizes the importance of adjusting attitudes and approaches of military 
forces for PSO, but reiterates the relevance and applicability of traditional military training.  
Opportunities for foreign intelligence and terrorist activities are a key concern for a 
peacekeeping unit, while observing and reporting duties represent the primary functions of such 
a force. 
65 
In terms of unit training, the manual maintains that units require typically four to six 
weeks of specialized training.  Uniquely, FM 100-23 does address the differences between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement in terms of key subjects that should be addressed for each.  
Unit training for peacekeeping missions should include: 
• The nature of PK 
• The establishment of lodgments 
• The performance of relief in place 
• Regional orientation 
• Establishment of a buffer zone 
• Supervision of a truce of cease-fire 
• The monitoring of boundaries 
• Contributions to maintenance of law and order 
• Negotiating skills 
• Mine and booby trap training and awareness 
• Assistance in rebuilding of infrastructure 
• Checkpoint operations 
• Investigation and reporting 
• Information collection 
• Patrolling 
• Media interrelationships 
• Staff training 
• Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a permissive environment 
• ROE 
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With respect to peace enforcement, the following subjects are relevant: 
• Fighting a meeting engagement 
• Conducting movement-to-contact and search and attack 
• Performing air assault 
• Enforcing UN sanctions 
• Protecting the human rights of people 
• Protecting humanitarian relief efforts 
• Separating warring factions 
• Disarming belligerent parties of heavy offensive weapons 
• Restoring territorial integrity 
• Restoring law and order 
• Demilitarizing forces and geographical areas in a non-permissive environment 
• Opening secure routes 
• ROE 
• Civil-military relations 
• Control of multinational units 
• Intelligence fusion and dissemination 
• NGO operations 
• Multinational logistics 
• Psychological operations 
• Intercultural communications 
• Raids, attacks, and defense 
• Public affairs media training 
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Although FM 100-23 differentiates peacekeeping from peace enforcement training 
subjects, the manual does not justify or explain the rationale behind each.  According to FM 100-
23, the single greatest factor behind the success of a peace operation may be leader development 
in terms of skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience.  Also, professionalism, 
impartiality, and inquisitiveness are expected among training participants.  Upon arriving in the 
mission area, soldiers participate in unit training to sustain traditional war-fighting skills as 
outlined in the Mission Essential Task List (METL).  Additionally, when working as part of a 
multinational contingent, FM 100-23 states that commanders should coordinate training to avoid 
alarming both the local populace and the disputing parties of the peace operation.  Subsequently, 
upon completion of the peace operation, commanders are reminded to reorient their soldiers to a 
traditional mindset developed by focusing on a wartime METL.  FM 100-23 indicates that war-
fighting skills must be redeveloped to counteract the dissimilar nature and related impact of 
peace operations on unit readiness. 
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING IN THE 
UNITED STATES ARMY 
After the United States Forces Command analyzes mission requirements and identifies a 
PSO, the individual Corps Commander is ultimately responsible for unit training and ensuring its 
readiness for a PSO.  Although the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort 
Monroe, Virginia, previously developed PSO doctrine, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, now maintains cognizance over Support Operations and Stability 
Operations (SASO).  In additional to the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the Army 
Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) at Carlisle Barracks, focuses on the strategic and operational levels 
of PSO policy, rather than tactical training.  Established in 1993, the Army PKI was designed to 
“engage with the Army leadership, various elements of the US Government, International 
Organizations, and the International Community on the military aspects of peace operations” 
(PKI Website).  Although a centralized organization for tactical level training does not exist, the 
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and the Army PKI, in addition to specialty schools, 
provide assistance to PSO unit commanders upon request. 
In response to the unique tactical requirements for peace support operations, the 
Commanding General of the United States Army Infantry School authorized the activation of the 
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29th Infantry Regiment Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site in February 
of 1997 (Speer E-mail).  Aimed at preparing soldiers for deployments to the Balkans, the 
commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for ensuring all personnel 
received core instruction on theatre specific tasks.   The Combat Maneuver Training Center 
(CMTC) developed and monitored the program of instruction (POI).  Initially, instructors were 
pooled from all Fort Benning tenant units, including the 29th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry 
Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment, 36th Engineer Group, and the Non-Commissioned Officers 
Academy.  Instructors conducted training for both deploy units and individual replacements. 
After only three months of operations, Commander, FORSCOM assumed responsibility 
for the TSIRT program.  Commander FORSCOM tasked the commander of First U.S. Army to 
provide instructors (34 instructors and one NCOIC) to train all deploying units.  The 29th 
Infantry Regiment maintained responsibility for training individual replacements with a training 
cadre of 27 instructors, one OIC, and one NCOIC.  To ensure adherence to tactical and technical 
standards, the 29th Infantry Regiment retains control of training.  However, CINCEUR maintains 
cognizance over the POI, while the 7th Army Training Command (ATC) develops and 
implements the curriculum. 
Through February 2002, the TSIRT site trained a total of 20,783 personnel, consisting of 
338 units and the remainder comprised of individual replacements.  Although the 29th Infantry 
Regiment remained committed to soldier training, manpower constraints and mission creep, 
defined as negative consequences of constantly changing missions, necessitated the requirement 
for greater training resources.  As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 
March of 2001 integrated assistance from the 5th U.S. Corps. 
Currently, the 1st Army provides nine instructors to TSIRT, while the 5th Army provides 
an additional nine.  These personnel serve 14 to 30 in support of TSIRT, specifically Operations 
Joint Forge and Joint Guardian.  Further, the 29th Regiment provides four full time civilian 
personnel and one NCOIC for additional support.  Depending upon operational tempo at the 
TSIRT site, six instructors, two drivers, and two combat lifesavers are provided as well by the 
29th Regiment.  Per Appendix D., personnel from active duty, reserve, and National Guard units 
receive theatre-specific training through the TSIRT site.  As depicted, instructors from the 29th 
Infantry Regiment, 1st Army, and 5th Army provide instructors for the program.  The TSIRT site 
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does not have any civilian personnel or representatives from external agencies assigned as 
instructors. 
 
D. TRAINING CONCEPT      
The foundation for PSO training is deeply rooted in the requirements for completing 
combat operations.  In fact, the Army contends that at least 60% of PSO tasks parallel combat 
mission requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command.  Training 
occurs in three general phases: pre-deployment, mission area, and post-operation.  After an Army 
unit is assigned or alerted to a PSO, the unit conducts PSO-unique training approximately 90 
days prior to deployment.  Upon assignment of the mission, the commander completes a mission 
analysis prior to commencing pre-deployment training.  Initially, key information is collected 
from the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), Field Manuals, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures Manuals (TTPs), Mission Training Plans (MTPs), and Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOPs).  The TTPs and Field Manuals provide principal guidance to 
soldiers at the operational and tactical level.  Unit leaders obtain further information through 
early reconnaissance missions into the AO, close contact with the present unit staff members (i.e. 
video teleconferences and battlefield updates), information from the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL), Higher Headquarters Directives (EUCOM, USAREUR, FORSCOM), and 
After Action Reviews.  For example, prior to deployment in October 2001, the 29th Infantry 
Division Headquarters visited Bosnia on several occasions to develop a training plan and to gain 
familiarity with higher HQs directives.  
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E. SKILL AREAS FOR U.S. ARMY TRAINING UNDER THE “CRAWL, WALK, 
RUN” MODEL 
The Army utilizes three levels for assessing training (Bankus 19): 
• Level 1:  “Crawl”-unit has just completed a major staff turnover; untrained 
personnel or limited practical application 
• Level 2: “Walk”-unit fairly cohesive and experienced; practical application 
completed in a majority of tasks 
• Level 3:  “Run”-unit has completed extensive practical application; considered 
“trained” 
Based on the Army Forces Command Directive and U.S. Army Europe guidance, 
numerous training exercises are completed at each level to ensure individual soldiers and entire 
units are prepared for deployment.  The 49th Armored Division, 101st Airborne/Air Assault, and 
25th 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions have utilized this training model.  At the apex of training, 
the unit conducts a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) to replicate upcoming theatre operations.  
The exercise emphasizes collective staff skills and unit tasks, in addition to individual 
competencies delineated by rank.  Training aids include antagonist role players and realistic town 
scenarios that emulate likely situations.  The MRE has a multinational and task force focus, 
which utilizes observers and controllers who provided guidance throughout the exercise.  Also, 
After Action Reviews (AARs) are conducted at every level for program feedback.  Finally, direct 
liaison is continuously maintained with staff members of the Multinational Division North 
(MND-N) in the mission area for realistic input.  The following terminal learning objectives 
apply to the MRE: 
• Rehearse/execute contingency plans (e.g. oversee elections) 
• Integrate force protection measures 
• Execute timely, accurate, and complete reporting 
• Refine reconnaissance and surveillance plan in accordance with the commander’s 
critical information requirements (CCIR) 
• Conduct negotiations and liaison procedures 
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• Rehearse Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC) actions 
• Conduct joint patrols with multinational brigades 
• Inspect weapons storage sites 
• Maintain detailed documentation of actions/events 
• Track and monitor mine clearing operations 
• Conduct countermine/counter-obstacle operations 
• Destroy confiscated weapons caches 
• Sustain the force 
• React to displaced personnel and refugees 
• React to civil unrest 
• Integrate ROE measures into the military decision making process 
Currently, the MRE is conducted at either the Combat Maneuver Training Center 
(CMTC) in Hoensfels, Germany or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, 
Louisiana.  Under extenuating circumstances, personnel augmentations or replacement may 
occur just prior to a unit’s PSO deployments.  In such cases, these soldiers are processed through 
the Continental United Stated Replacement Center (CRC) at Fort Benning, Georgia.  Figure 10 
presents an example schedule for CRC training. 
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Figure 10. U.S. Army Schedule for CRC Training  
 
In comparing traditional combat tasks and techniques to those required for PSO, the 
Army’s research shows that 87% are the same for combat-arms units at the platoon level and 
84% the same at the company level (Bankus).  While these tasks are applicable to both combat-
related missions and PSO, the situational environment and means of employment are quite 
different.  At the platoon, company, and small unit leader levels, the Army identifies the 
following PSO-unique tasks: 
• Small Unit Leader Tasks 
o Exchanging information 
o Working with an interpreter 
o Conduct negotiations 
• Company Tasks 
o Conduct negotiations 
Day Subject/Activity 
1 In-processing 
2 Medical screening and USAREUR driver training 
3 Soldier Readiness Processing, Organizational Clothing Issue, M16A2 Pre-Marksmanship 
Instruction 
4 Protective mask fitting and confidence training, M9, M16A2 and other qualification ranges. 
Soldiers qualify with the weapon they carry into theater 
5 General and Theater Specific Training (Preventive Medicine/ Environmental Threat, SAEDA, 
OPSEC, Code of Conduct, Law of Land Warfare, Country Overview, Rules of Engagement, 
Media Awareness, Anti-Fratricide, and Anti-Terrorism) and USAREUR driver testing 
6 Individual Replacement Training (Day One). Students rotate through six stations (MEDEVAC 
procedures, Driving Hazards/Convoy operations, Countermine Operations, Mine Awareness, and 
Force Protection Skills) 
7 Individual Replacement Training (Day Two); students rotate through two lanes to practice skills; 
Situational Awareness (Media Interview, Conduct Searches, Local Security, Encounter 
Civilians); Force Protection (Mines, Booby Traps and Unexploded Ordinance, React to 




o Controlling civil disturbances 
o Controlling checkpoints 
o Securing a route 
o Conduct coordination with other units/groups 
o Conducting presence operations (as a deterrent) 
o Processing confiscated documents, equipment, and materials 
• Platoon Tasks 
o Operating observation posts 
o Conducting a presence patrol 
o Conducting civil disturbance operations 
o Operating a checkpoint 
o Securing a route 
o Searching a building 
o Processing confiscated documents, equipment, and material 
At the battalion and higher levels of command, contact skills are even more critical in 
terms of interacting with belligerents, the local populace, and other organizations.  Also, leaders 
must have a complete understanding of the political context and underlying issues associated 
with a PSO. 
Within the actual area of operations for a given mission, the Army uses Battlefield 
Operating Systems (BOS) to systematically ensure that all elements of a unit’s combat power are 
effectively brought to bear in accomplishing the mission.  However, after action reviews from 
operations in Bosnia conducted by the 49th Armored Division, a Texas Army National Guard 
unit, revealed that BOS factors are quite different between combat missions and PSO.  Basically, 
combat functions of fire support and air defense are substituted with requirements for 
information operations, inter-military coordination, and civil-military operations.  As a result, 
commanders must consider these factors when developing training plans. 
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Since the timeframe for PSO deployments impacts pre-deployment training programs, a 
unit deployment schedule has been established for operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo.  Of 
particular note, six units out of eight units designated for upcoming deployments are Army 
National Guard unit.  Ultimately, such emphasis on the “One Army Concept” has great 
implications for training at both the unit and individual levels. 
 
F. TRAINING FOR U.S. ARMY RESERVE UNITS 
The Leader Development and Education For Sustained Peace (LDESP) program at the 
Naval Postgraduate School offers a 6-day graduate education program for units deploying to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Classroom instruction is preceded by a web-based preparation course, 
while mission-specific training opportunities are available after the course.  The course utilizes 
lessons learned to facilitate consistent and continuous training, concentrating on knowledge 
management within the areas of operation.  Within the operational environment, constant 
coordination, lessons learned, and knowledge management help to diminish consequences 
associated with senior military personnel turnovers approximately every six months.  Ultimately, 
the LDESP program provides a conceptual framework for graduates, primarily senior leaders, to 
understand the likely effects of military decisions made in a rapidly changing, complex, and 




VIII. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research analyzes various models for PSO training at the international, regional, and 
national levels to identify implications and provide recommendations for enhancing PSO training 
within the U.S. Military.  From an organizational systems perspective, the UN serves as the 
principal organization responsible for authorizing, establishing, and coordinating PSO at the 
international level.  Accordingly, the UN training program for PSO, promulgated through the 
TES of the DPKO, represents the foundation for regional and national programs to emulate and 
build upon.  Subsequently, these programs develop processes to meet tactical-level training 
requirements for individuals and units assigned to UN missions.  For this research, the PSO 
training programs of the UN, the Nordic countries, the Canadian Forces, the German Military, 
and the U.S. Military are evaluated based on the following criteria: 
1. Mandate.  Decisions made at the strategic level that set the direction for establishing or 
enhancing PSO training.  The mandate may result from external influences, such as an 
event within the environment, or from internal shifts within the system. 
2. Structure.  A centralized or decentralized framework designed to support the training of 
personnel at the tactical level of operations.  Programs may be either institutionalized as a 
distinctive organization or developed ad hoc to meet immediate requirements.  Further, 
while programs may address training needs at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels, this research focuses on preparing individuals and units at the tactical level of 
operations. 
3. Curricular formalization.  The degree of consistency in developing training standards 
and academic lesson plans. 
4. Coordination and communication mechanisms.  Capabilities of the institution or 
training provider to interact within the organization (internal) and cooperate with outside 
agencies (external). 
5.  Participants.  The intended recipients of the training curriculum, which may be directed 
towards military personnel, civilians, or a combination thereof.  Further, these 
participants may have various levels of seniority and differing degrees of PSO 
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experience.  The training program may be prescribed for a single military service, a joint 
body, or even a multi-national contingent.  
6. Evaluation methods.  Techniques for determining if critical success factors for training 
have been achieved.  In the mission area, PSO personnel seek to maintain or develop a 
stable environment conducive to diplomatic efforts that lead to resolution of the 
underlying issues.  Therefore, critical success factors focus relate to the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of the training program.  However, difficulties in measuring 
these elements may require the use of proxy variables, such as the number of military and 
civilian casualties, mission completion time, duration of peace sustained after PSO 
personnel withdraw, and resources expended in terms of personnel and financial support.  
7. Feedback mechanisms.  Based on training results in the form of outputs, outcomes, and 
cultural effects, the responsive and adaptation of training programs to environmental 
factors and performance evaluations.  Feedback may be immediate from personnel in the 
mission area or formally stated in subsequent after action reports/lessons learned. 
 
B. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
Per Table 2 through 6, a chart for each model depicts the current status and key factors 
associated with each program criterion.   
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Table 2.   United Nations PSO Training Program Analysis 
Criteria Status 
Mandate • “Establish the minimum training, equipment, and other 
standards required for forces to participate in UN 
peacekeeping operations”(Brahimi Rpt 35) 
• Develop standby teams of qualified officers to participate 
in advanced training with troop contributing Member 
States (35) 
Structure • Centralized body that collects, coordinates, and 
disseminates training materials to subordinate training 
organizations at the regional and national levels 
• Decentralized in terms of training support and programs; 
lack of onsite training facilities 
Curricular formalization • General guidelines and basic training materials provided to 
regional and Member State programs 
• Documentation focused strictly on methods and techniques 
for peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO) 
• No established PSO doctrine 
• No official training standards 
Coordination and communication 
mechanisms 
• Mobile UN Training Assistance Teams support personnel 
training of subordinate organizations 
• Information, training materials, and correspondence 
courses available via the internet; chat room initiated 
2/28/02 
Participants • Participants must request assistance to the training 
organization; UN training assistance not mandatory for 
participants 
• Correspondence courses available to both military and 
civilian personnel at a monetary cost 
Evaluation methods • Limited 
• UN correspondence courses graded online 
Feedback mechanisms • Lessons Learned Unit completes the following: 
o Obtains first hand information form mid- and end-of-
mission assessments observing units and questioning 
personnel 
o Gathers data from secondary sources, such as 
publications, media evaluation, and end-of-tour 
reports from key personnel 
o Conduct empirical analysis of after-action 
questionnaires distributed to key personnel and 
workshop/seminar attendees 
o Ensure accessibility of obtained information a 






Table 3.   NORDCAPS PSO Training Program Analysis 
 
Criteria Status 
Mandate • Develop a functional, multi-national crisis contingent by 
2003 controlled by either an international or regional 
body, such as the UN, OSCE, EU, or NATO 
Structure • Centralized for administration and planning 
• Decentralized to national programs for providing 
training in designated areas 
Curricular formalization • Course materials developed by national organizations; 
shared with other members 
• No official training standards 
• Focused strictly on methods and techniques for 
peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO) 
Coordination and communication 
mechanisms 
• Strategic talks among national defense ministers 
• Operational planning among staff representatives to 
NORDCAPS 
• Information sharing with other members of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
Participants • Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish military 
personnel for national training; high experience levels 
• Multi-national participants from foreign countries 
• Civilian police 
Evaluation methods •   Training center staff members observe trained personnel   
  in the mission area 
Feedback mechanisms •   Varies based on national program components 
 
79 
Table 4.   Canadian Forces PSO Training Program Analysis 
 
Criteria Status 
Mandate Increase consistency and depth of PSO training through 
institutionalized programs-DCDS 
Structure • Centralized PSTC that directs and oversees training of 
military personnel; actual training may be conducted 
onsite or by assigned training cells mobilized to unit 
locations   
• Decentralized responsibility of unit commanders to meet 
individual and unit training requirements prior to 
deployment 
• Pearson Peacekeeping Training Center designated for 
strategic studies and research (primarily civilian 
attendees) 
Curricular formalization • Focused strictly on methods and techniques for 
peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO) 
training  
• Participants evaluated according to training standards 
and practical application exercises 
Coordination and communication 
mechanisms 
• Information sharing with other members of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
Participants • Military personnel from all service elements, 
representing a wide range of experience levels and 
officer/enlisted ranks 
Evaluation methods • Evaluation techniques: 
o Participants complete questionnaires regarding 
the quantity and quality of the training program 
o End of course debrief and associated reports 
o Staff After-Action reports 
• Validation techniques: 
o Staff members observe and query trained 
personnel in the mission area 
o On-the-job questionnaires to troops 
o Supervisor questionnaires 
o Discussions/Focus groups  
Feedback mechanisms • Outcome of the evaluation methods:  on-site (training 
facilities) and off-site (mission area) forms the basis of 
revisions to the program curriculum 
• Lessons Learned Center publishes detailed information 
on PSO   
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Mandate • Establish a central peacekeeping training center to 
enhance future preparations for PSO missions; 
organization should focus on developing expertise in 
assessing future mission requirements-German 
Government responding to experiences in UNOSOM II 
in 1993 
Structure • Centralized training center-requisite for all military PSO 
participants 
Curricular formalization • No official training standards 
Coordination and communication 
mechanisms 
• Mandatory attendance for military personnel and units 
assigned to PSO reduces communication requirements 
(formalized command and control) 
• Civilians, primarily civil service, journalists, and police, 
request training/preparation for assignments 
supporting/reporting PSO  
Participants • German Army soldiers (Officers and NCOs) for national 
training; high experience levels 
• Multi-national and multi-service participants from 
foreign countries 
• Civilians (civil service, police, and journalists) 
Evaluation methods • Training center staff members observe trained personnel 
in the mission area 
Feedback mechanisms • Pertinent information relayed to the training center about 
changes in the mission area 
• Training center personnel dispatched for further inquiry 
and insight 
• After-action reports based on PSO experience 
• Oral discussions with experienced personnel returning 
from the mission area 
• Lessons learned incorporated into the training program 
for future missions 
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Mandate • None; training “summed up as just enough and just in 
time”-FM 100-23 
• PSO do not represent new missions; should not be added 
to a unit’s mission essential task list (METL)  
Structure • TSIRT:  Theatre-specific training site (tactical level) 
developed to meet training requirements for personnel 
deploying to the Balkans 
• U.S. Army PKI:  Strategic level organization developed 
to enhance doctrine and senior leadership education 
• Limited interaction between the U.S. Army PKI and 
TSIRT  
Curricular formalization • No formal Program of Instruction (POI) or official 
training standards 
• Lesson plans, course outlines, and presentations 
developed onsite to prepare personnel deploying to the 
Balkans  
• Theatre-specific focus; short-term perspective 
• Focused on mission familiarization training 
Coordination and communication 
mechanisms 
• TSIRT attendance mandatory requirement for all 
personnel assigned to the Balkans 
• Minimal communication with other peace training 
centers-TSIRT not an official center (designated 
internally as a “site”)  
Participants • U.S. Army soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, 
Red Cross personnel, contracted personnel (i.e. 
interpreters), and Army and Air Force Exchange Service 
(AAFES) representatives assigned to PSO in the Balkans 
• Not specified for joint training of Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps personnel 
Evaluation methods • Instructors complete After Action Reviews (AAR) upon 
completion of each training area 
• Limited evaluation of participants; focus on 
familiarization 
• Student surveys completed upon training conclusion; 
pertinent recommendations submitted to the 7th ATC for 
possible POI modifications 
• TSIRT representatives periodically observe personnel in 
the mission area  
Feedback mechanisms • Contact with the Center for Army Lessons Learned 
(CALL) 
• Task force commander utilizes chain-of-command to 
express training concerns 
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C. EVALUATION OF THE UN MODEL 
At the international level of military PSO training, the current UN program, developed 
primarily in response to the Brahimi Report, represents a positive shift in the perception of 
training relevance through the institutionalization of the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) 
within the DPKO.  However, since the UN does not maintain control over a standing military 
force, training methodologies revolve around a decentralized process, which relies upon regional 
and Member State organizations to conduct training at all levels—most notably tactical 
preparations—to meet mission requirements.  Since the United Nations does not conduct onsite 
tactical training for individuals and units, the TES focuses on mobile UNTAT, correspondence 
courses, and online information to influence training on all levels.  Currently, Member States are 
not required to either request or receive training from these mobile teams prior to deploying for 
PSO.  Although the UN serves as the lead agency for international PSO, a doctrinal training 
strategy and associated performance standards for units and individuals have not been developed.  
These shortcomings limit the organization’s ability to oversee and support personnel training of 
contributing Member Sates.  Further, UN training principles distributed via CD-ROM and online 
information limit PSO guidelines strictly to peacekeeping operations.  While a broader spectrum 
of PSO, including peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace building are referenced in UN 
publications, such dimensions fail to be sufficiently addressed within training reference 
materials.  
 
D. EVALUATION OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES’ MODEL 
Regarding regional PSO training programs, the common views of peace support 
requirements between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden evolved into the Nordic 
Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) programs.  The framework for 
NORDCAPS focuses on establishing multi-national contingencies to support either NATO or 
EU forces assigned to UN-mandated PSO.  To prepare personnel for these contingencies, 
differentiated training responsibilities are assigned to individual nations.  Serving as an 
administrative body, NORDCAPS representatives plan training exercises within the Nordic 
countries, while coordinating externally with other organizations and nations.  Additionally, 
strategic level discussions occur annually between defense ministers and senior military officials.  
By obtaining the support of national leaders, NORDCAPS has successfully institutionalized its 
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importance within the realm of PSO.  Further, coordination continues to occur at the operational 
level between NORDCAPS staff members.  The close relationship between the Nordic countries 
regarding PSO training facilitated development of the EAPC on the international level.  
Although the Nordic countries cooperate in strategic planning, the training programs of 
individual nations vary.  As a result, training area specialization and associated expertise have 
grown among all four contributors.  For example, rather than focusing on all aspects of PSO 
training, national programs focus efforts on certain areas, such as Sweden’s role in educating 
staff officers.  Although lacking training standards across national organizations, these countries 
effectively share the burden of resource expenditures, while simultaneously taking advantage of 
specialized national programs.  Comparable to the UN perspective on PSO, the NORDCAPS 
model and its component programs focus strictly upon peacekeeping, rather than addressing 
other dimensions of PSO.  The marked distinction between peacekeeping and other PSO resulted 
in a unilateral focus on peacekeeping training.  Although peacekeeping missions under Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter are preferable to the uncertainties of other PSO, primarily peace 
enforcement missions, future operations will likely challenge participants with aspects of all 
types. 
 
E. EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL MODELS:  PROGRAMS OF THE 
CANADIAN FORCES, THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, AND THE UNITED 
STATES MILITARY 
When examining initial mandates relative to the three national-level programs, both the 
Canadian and German Governments responded to operational failures in Somalia by 
investigating, identifying, and implementing training strategies to lessen the likelihood of such 
shortcomings in future operations.  Further, these countries institutionalized training programs 
and associated infrastructure within three years of the UN mission to Somalia.  However, the 
U.S. Military responded to shortcomings in Somalia by developing doctrine and disseminating 
publications, such as FM 100-23.  The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) developed such 
doctrine to improve strategic level planning and coordination.  However, an institutionalized 
PSO training program at the tactical level never materialized. 
The Canadian Deputy Chief of Defense established the PSTC in 1996 to better prepare 
military personnel for PSO in numerous areas worldwide.  Likewise, the German Army Chief of 
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Staff instructed the development of a peacekeeping school in 1994.  Subsequently, in the mid-
1990’s, when regional conflict erupted in the Balkans that required peacekeeping personnel, both 
the Canadian Forces and the German Armed Forces addressed training challenges by adapting 
course curricula within their respective training institutions.  However, lacking a centralized 
organization for PSO training, the U.S. Army developed an impromptu, theater-specific TSIRT 
site to prepare personnel for missions to Kosovo and Bosnia.  Although lacking an 
institutionalized framework, the TSIRT site has gradually developed lessons plans and course 
materials to prepare both military personnel and particular civilians for Balkan deployments.  
The scope and detail of these training areas has not reached the level of official training 
standards, such as those utilized by the Canadian Forces.  With respect to Department of the 
Army doctrine, FM 100-23 emphasizes that PSO tasks should not be considered as part of a 
unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL).  Without an institutionalized organization and a 
curriculum centered on PSO-specific training standards, the U.S. Military’s ability to respond in 
an effective and efficient way to future PSO may be severely hampered. 
With respect to coordination and communication elements within the three national 
models, the PSTC, the German Training Center, and the TSIRT site all exist as subordinate 
organizations/elements within the Department of the Army or, with respect to Canada, the Land 
Element.  PSO training within Canada has developed in a rather dualistic manner; only military 
personnel receive training at the PSTC, while civilians and senior military officials attend the 
Pearson Center.  Regarding German PSO training, conducted at the German Infantry School, 
military personnel, primarily Army soldiers, journalists, police, and other civilians can receive 
applicable training.  The TSIRT remains dedicated to theater-specific training for U.S. Army and 
support personnel deploying to the Balkans. 
As institutionalized PSO training programs, the PSTC and the German Peace Training 
Center maintain contact and conduct liaison with similar organizations worldwide.  For example, 
both institutions submit course information to the EAPC for distribution.  This communication 
facilitates institutional knowledge sharing and promotes a sense of teamwork among staff 
members assigned to these organizations.  As an unofficial training site, the TSIRT program 
lacks credibility and faces challenges in gaining support from established training centers.  
Further, the TSIRT site maintains limited contact with training representatives from other Army 
organizations, while communications among military services is nearly non-existent. 
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In terms of evaluating the performance of training participants, the PSTC, the German 
Training Center, and the TSIRT site utilize similar personnel observation techniques in mission 
areas to ascertain measures of training effectiveness.  While the German program appears to lack 
direct feedback from course participants, the PSTC and the TSIRT site utilize student 
questionnaires to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of training.  Finally, all three 
organizations rely upon After Action Reports/Lessons Learned to modify and improve their 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In summary, this thesis presents the following findings regarding the initial research 
questions: 
Primary research question:  What curricular considerations, educational areas, and 
instructional methodologies are pertinent to a tactical level PSO training program in the 
U.S. Military? 
Curricular considerations: 
• Intended audience (Service-specific/joint, civilian participants, experience levels, 
student demographics) 
• Type of courses-basic, specialized, or mission-specific 
• Training Medium-residential, distance learning, or mobile training teams 
• Identification/training of instructor pool 
• Scope of PSO instruction-peacekeeping or expanded to include other PSO types 
• Development of training standards and course materials 
• Methods of evaluating training effectiveness 
• Feedback mechanisms for modifying and improving the program  
Training for PSO should focus on the close interaction of U.S. service members with 
other national militaries, civilian organizations, the disputing parties to the conflict, and the local 
populace.  Additionally, personnel require training in the following educational areas: 
• History and fundamentals of PSO 
• Specific mission concerns (i.e. cultural awareness, geography, mission operations, 
and intelligence) 
• Peace support duties (applicable to military observers) 
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• Patrolling skills specific to PSO 
• Mine awareness 
• Hostage survival skills 
• Negotiation and mediation 
• Preventive medicine 
• Media awareness 
• Equipment recognition of weapons systems 
• Stress management 
• Application of force and Rules of Engagement (ROE) understanding 
• Cross cultural awareness 
• Legal Issues and personal conduct 
• Administration, allowances, and benefits 
Instructional Methodologies: 
• Classroom presentations/guest speakers 
• Practical applications exercises 
• Command Post exercises 
• Web-based learning 
• Correspondence courses 
• Simulation training/virtual environments 
Secondary research questions: 
1. How many PSO training models currently exist throughout the world?  
As of March 14, 2002, the United Nations website identified 81 Member State 
countries conducting peacekeeping training.  A preponderance of training programs 
focuses on traditional peacekeeping, rather than addressing the multi-dimensional 
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nature of PSO.  Additionally, regional training organizations, international training 
initiatives, such as those sponsored by the UN, and cross-national programs have 
developed as well. 
2. What organizations are responsible for developing and implementing PSO 
training programs within selected countries?  Are the programs centralized in 
the form of joint training or decentralized by service departments? 
Based on the national training models examined, the Army branch or equivalent land 
service maintains cognizance over PSO training.  However, the actual training 
programs may be institutionalized within a designated training center, such as the 
Canadian Peace Support Training Center (PSTC), or subordinated to an infantry 
school command, as exemplified in the German and U.S. Military (i.e. U.S. Army) 
models.  Based on land force requirements for PSO, training programs have focused 
on preparing such forces for UN missions.  However, the interoperability of Canadian 
military personnel, primarily among administrative specialties, has facilitated joint 
training within that model.   
3. What are the curricular components of current PSO training programs? 
From the national models examined, most PSO training occurs residentially, either 
onsite at a designated training center or at a unit’s home station.  Distance learning, in 
terms of correspondence courses and web-based education, has only been 
implemented within the decentralized training model of the United Nations.  At the 
national level, Canada offers a certificate of completion for PSO courses, while the 
German Army and U.S. Army programs simply mandate completion.  Depending on 
the training model, between one and two weeks of PSO-specific training are 
designated during an overall pre-deployment training window of approximately 90 
days.  Further, while the Canadian PSTC and German UN Training Center conduct 
training for all current PSO missions, the U.S. Army provides only theater-specific 
courses.  Finally, the balance of general military training with mission-specific 
training varies across models.      
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4. What training methodologies, such as simulation, classroom instruction, and 
electronic learning, are being utilized to provide instruction? 
• Extensive classroom instruction with presentations and guest speakers 
• Practical application exercises for certain techniques, such as prodding for mines and 
conducting crowd control techniques 
• Command Post (CP) exercises for staff members 
• Limited use of electronic learning, except for the German multimedia CD-ROM and 
the United Nations publications CD-ROM and web-based information platform 
5. How have national strategies, cultural sensitivities, lessons learned, and other 
factors contributed to the development of PSO training models? 
Although national strategies and cultural factors affect military PSO training, this 
research did not focus on the diversity of national interests and associated strategic 
policies.  However, within the international arena, the end of the Cold War greatly 
impacted the frequency and types of PSO and related training.  Further, repercussions 
from lessons learned in Somalia (UNOSOM) operations brought about substantial 
changes to many PSO training programs, particularly among the national models of 
Canada and Germany.    
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This section provides conclusions regarding PSO training commonalities, strengths, and 
weaknesses of the United Nations model, the NORDCAPS regional program, and the national 
models of Canada, Germany, and the United States.  
Although establishing the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the United 
Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) increased institutional emphasis 
on PSO training, the organization lacks a unifying doctrine for PSO and associated 
training required to coordinate programs among Member States and regional 
organizations effectively. 
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Based on recommendations in the Brahimi Report of 2000, the TES implemented a 
decentralized PSO training program at the international level.  Since the United Nations does not 
command a standing military force, PSO training among subordinate organizations at the 
regional and Member State level is loosely coordinated through online information, a training 
CD-ROM, and correspondence courses.  Also, mobile training teams are dispatched to assist 
Member States that request additional training support for upcoming UN Missions.  Ultimately, 
the TES serves in a primarily administrative role, rather than operational, in collecting and 
disseminating information from subordinate training programs. 
Although the United Nations PSO training program serves effectively as a collector, 
disseminator, and limited coordinator of subordinate training program information, the 
organization lacks control over the international arena of PSO training.  Without an international 
doctrine for PSO, Member States and regional organizations rely upon various curricula, training 
methodologies, and standards to prepare personnel for UN-mandated PSO.  Further, the UN does 
not require Member States to obtain “face-to-face” training time with UN Training Assistance 
Teams (UNTATs).  Alternatively, UN representatives from the Training and Evaluation Service 
(TES) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should play an active role in 
developing PSO courses and programs within Member States by conducting periodic visits to 
training areas and allocating time to serve as onsite, liaison staff members.  Developing a 
working relationship with staff counterparts of Member State PSO programs could improve the 
effectiveness of UNTATs through close interaction and constant feedback.  
 
The NORDCAPS program between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
represents a unified commitment to promote interoperability and knowledge management 
at the regional level of PSO and associated training. 
By coordinating training programs among the four national participants, each maximizes 
expertise in certain area, while reducing manpower and resource requirements.  Further, in 
addition to knowledge management within the regional body, training participants develop a 
unique camaraderie and a share a reinforced commitment towards common goals.  Although 
lacking training standards among component organizations, the NORDCAPS program provides a 
mechanism for sharing ideas and perspectives essential for improving training. 
92 
The U.S. Military lacks an institutionalized PSO training program to meet long-
term operational requirements at the tactical level. 
Among the United States Armed Forces, the U.S. Army maintains primary responsibility 
for undertaking PSO and developing associated training.  While the U.S. Army utilizes the Army 
Peacekeeping Institute to address doctrinal issues at the strategic and operational levels, a 
comparable tactical-level training organization does not exist.  Therefore, training 
responsibilities for personnel and units deploying for PSO fall directly upon the unit commander.  
In response to training needs for Bosnia and Kosovo missions in the Balkans, the Commanding 
General of the United States Army Infantry School authorized the 29th Infantry Regiment 
Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site in 1997 to conduct theater-specific 
training for soldiers and support personnel.  However, since the U.S. Army does not consider 
PSO-related tasks as requisite additions to a unit’s mission essential task list (METL), the TSIRT 
site remains a short-term solution specific to training requirements for the Balkans.  If additional 
PSO requirements develop, training platforms, in addition to manpower and resource allocations, 
will require a significant transformation to meet those operational training needs.  Additionally, 
since PSO remain under cognizance of the U.S. Army, the other Armed Services continue to lack 
sufficient training for either direct combat roles or supporting missions for PSO.  For example, 
the Marine Corps may be called upon to act in a peace enforcement capacity before a 
peacekeeping force of the U.S. may be deployed.  As stated in Field Manual 100-23, U.S. 
Military doctrine properly recognizes the differences between certain PSO, notably peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement.      
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the international level, the TES of the United Nations DPKO should actively 
develop and coordinate all levels of training among Member States and regional 
organizations that participate in PSO mandated by the UN.   
Prior to deploying for the mission area, United Nations’ representatives should oversee 
and assist with standardized personnel training for all participating Member States and regional 
organizations.  Regardless of political and economic circumstances affecting troop-contributing 
nations, prerequisite training serves a critical function in uniting all contingents under a common 
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perspective and developing analogous skill levels.  While some nations may require advanced 
training support from the UN, all troop-contributing bodies should meet established training 
criteria by maintaining direct liaison with UN training representatives.  Despite lacking a 
doctrine for PSO, the UN should periodically provide onsite training assistance to national 
organizations to develop and enhance programs following UN guidelines.  Further, the United 
Nations should solicit feedback from the recipient organizations to modify and improve upon the 
effectiveness and efficiently of these training teams.  As a centralized method for improving 
training, the United Nations could sponsor conferences, seminars, or planning sessions to 
assemble representatives from training programs worldwide. In this capacity, the TES would 
serve in a coordination role comparable to that of NORDCAPS at the regional level. 
 
Based on the NORDCAPS regional model for promoting PSO training, Canada and 
the United States should consider developing a closer relationship to advance PSO training 
through sharing course materials and developing a mutual understanding of PSO. 
As an institutionalized training organization, the Canadian Forces PSTC developed 
training programs adapted for mission requirements, taking into account the demographics and 
experience levels of training participants.  By maintaining a flexible training program for UN 
missions worldwide, the curriculum for Canada’s basic PSO course can be modified to include 
both general information and mission-specific requirements.  In contrast, the TSIRT site utilized 
by the U.S. Army for training personnel for theater-specific missions to the Balkans lacks the 
institutional support and curricular depth to develop as a viable, long-term training program.  
When PSO missions and associated training requirements for the Balkans conclude, the U.S. 
Military, likely the U.S. Army, will be forced to improvise another training program in response 
to future PSO missions.  By developing a closer relationship with the Canadian PSTC, 
information sharing provides a partial solution for developing and improving PSO training in the 
U.S. Military.  Also, as a member of NATO, the United States should actively participate in the 
TEPSO Program to improve international relations, while advancing PSO training at the tactical 
level.  Finally, within the United States Department of the Army, the tactical-level TSIRT site 
would benefit tremendously from coordination and cooperation with the Peacekeeping Institute 
at the strategic and operational levels.   
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If the United States Military continues to participate in PSO, the Department of 
Defense should examine alternative models for PSO training at the tactical level.  Given the 
complexity and frequency of PSO in the last decade, a comprehensive training program 
must be developed to address the myriad operational requirements facing personnel in the 
mission area.  However, prior to setting a certain direction for PSO training, a thorough 
cost-benefit analysis and further research should be conducted.  
Comparable to the German Peace Training Center, PSO training could be expanded 
under the Army Infantry School; however, since PSO typically involve either combat units or 
support elements from the other Armed Forces, participants should not be limited to Army 
soldiers and support personnel.  Such an arrangement would reduce infrastructure requirements, 
but would symbolically project a close relationship between traditional combat training and that 
necessary for PSO.  However, referring to the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) of the 
Canadian Forces, an organization separate from ground forces training could be created to focus 
strictly on preparing for PSO.  Although a subordinate organization under the Army Infantry 
School could achieve credibility, a designated organization, whether within the Department of 
the Army or developed as a joint command, may have greater flexibility and deference in 
working with other peace training centers worldwide. 
Regardless of the organizational structure developed to support PSO training, a training 
needs assessment should be conducted for each curriculum.  General training areas, such as the 
roles and importance of civilian organizations, should be imparted to all PSO participants.  
Course curricula for PSO training must address the following requirements: 
• Training standards based on knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) essential for success 
in the mission 
• Experience levels and student demographics of participants to focus directly on student 
needs 
• Instructional methods, such as classroom instruction, practical application and role-
playing exercises, correspondence courses, and website learning resources, that 
thoroughly immerse participants within the curriculum 
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• Evaluation methods, consisting of written examinations, practical application exercises, 
and personnel observations within the mission areas, that validate student mastery of the 
training standards 
• Feedback mechanisms, based on participant questionnaires, after-action reports, and 
lessons learned, that provide critical information for developing and enhancing PSO 
training  
Further, while similar peacekeeping missions may be conducted simultaneously in different 
regions of the world, training requirements will vary based on Rules of Engagement (ROE), 
cultural sensitivities, geographic differences, and other factors specific to the mission.  Thus, 
individual training curriculum must be mission-specific and tailored towards the participants 
preparing for deployment.   
 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While this research examined several PSO training models at the international, regional, 
and national levels, subsequent studies could focus on a particular aspect of a training 
curriculum, such as instructional methodologies/types, to identify specific applications for PSO.  
For example, given the global use of the Internet, curricular components could be differentiated 
by those best suited for either distance learning or an educational portal.   
For researchers investigating the development of a specific PSO curriculum, a detailed 
content analysis of several similar courses at the national level, such as a military observers 
course, could be beneficial for identifying particular strengths and weakness of existing models.  
Also, a cost-benefit analysis of various models could help to identify the most advantageous 
program with respect to the U.S. Military. 
Regarding a quantitative assessment of PSO training models, further research could 
evaluate training effectiveness by utilizing proxy variables in terms of casualty statistics (military 
and civilian), mission duration, or time elapsed between mission “completion” and a re-
emergence of conflict.  However, additional variables, such as contingent assignment, number of 
personnel deployed, and type/frequency of PSO involvement, must be controlled for across 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AAFES Army and Air Force Exchange Service 
AAR After Action Report 
AC Area of Operations 
ACCP Army Correspondence Course Program 
AIPD Army Institute for Professional Development 
ATC Army Training Command 
AWS Amphibious Warfare School 
BOS Battlefield Operating Systems 
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned 
CAX Combined Arms Exercise 
CCA Cross Cultural Awareness 
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
CD-ROM Compact Disc Read-Only Memory 
CDS Chief of Defense Staff 
CF Canadian Forces 
CHOD Chief of Defense 
CIMIC (Nordic) Civil-Military Cooperation Course 
CINCEUR Commander-in-Chief Europe  
CIS Communication and Information Systems 
CJ7/PLE Chairman, Joint Planning/Planning Element 
CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
CLFCSC Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College 
CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center 
CMTF Civil-Military Task Force 
CONUSA Continental United States Army 
CPX Command Post Exercise 
CRC Continental United States Replacement Center 
CTC Combat Training Center 
DAG Departure Assistance Team 
DCDS Deputy Chief of Defense Staff 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
ECR End of Course Report 
EDP Electronic Data Processing 
EOD Explosives Ordnance Disposal 
ERT Extended Range of Tasks 
EU European Union 
EUCOM European Command 
EVA Einsatzverbandsausbildung (German) 
FINCENT Finnish Defense Forces International Center 
FORSCOM Forces Command 
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INTCIS International Communication and Information Systems Course 
INTCOC International Commanding Officers Course 
INTSLOC International Senior Logistic Officers Course 
INTSUPSOC International Support Staff Officers Course 
JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List 
JOA Joint Operations Area 
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center 
JWC  Joint Warfare Center 
KFOR International Security Force in Kosovo 
KSA Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
LDESP Leader Development and Education For Sustained Peace 
LFC Land Force Command 
LFDTS Land Force Doctrine and Training System 
LL Lessons Learned 
LOG Logistics 
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 
METL Mission Essential Task List 
MFO Multinational Force and Observers 
MND-N Multinational Division North 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOD Ministry of Defense 
MONUC 
 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MRE Mission Rehearsal Exercise 
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 
MTP Mission Training Plan 
MTT Mobile Training Teams 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO/PFPLOC 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Partnership for Peace Logistics Officers
Course 
NCG Nordic Coordination Group 
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 
NCOIC Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NMCG NORDCAPS Military Coordination Group 
NODEFIC Norway Defense Forces International Center 
NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support 
NORDSAMFN Nordiska samarbetsgruppen i militära FN-ärenden 
NPFR Nordic Pool of Forces Register 
NSG NORDCAPS Steering Group 
NWG/CD NORDCAPS Working Group Course Directors 
OCSE/EUMOC 
 
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe and European Union
Monitors and Observers Course 
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OOTW Operations Other Than War 
OP Operation 
OPCON Operational Control 
OPSEC Operational Security 
OSCE Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe 
PDD-25 Presidential Decision Directive 25 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
PFPJSOC Partnership for Peace Junior Staff Officers Course 
PFPSOC Partnership for Peace Staff Officers Course 
PIFWC Persons Indicated For War Crimes 
PIO Press and Information Officers 
PKI Peace Keeping Institute 
PKO Peace Keeping Operations 
PLE Planning Element 
PME Professional Military Education 
POCI Program of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations 
POI Program of Instruction 
PPC Pearson Peace Center 
PSO Peace Support Operation 
PSTC Peace Support Training Center 
PVO Private Voluntary Organizations 
RMC Royal Military College  
ROE Rules of Engagement 
S&E Standardization and Evaluation 
SAEDA Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army 
SASO Stability and Support Operations  
SCD Senior Course Director 
SFOR Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
SISIP Service Income Security Insurance Plan 
SME Subject Matter Experts 
SNCO Staff Non-Commissioned Officer 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SWEDINT Swedish Armed Forces International Center 
TBS The Basic School 
TC Training Cell 
TES Training and Evaluation Service 
TF Task Force 
TRADOC (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command 
TSIRT Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training 
TSP Training Support Packages 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Manuals 
UN United Nations 
UNJOC United Nations Junior Officers Course 
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
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UNITAR UN Institute for Training and Research 
UNLOC United Nations Logistics Officers Course 
UNMEE UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNMILPOC (Nordic) United Nations Military Police Course 
UNMOC United Nations Military Observer Course 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
UNSOC United Nations Staff Officers Course 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
UNTAT United Nations Training Assistance Team 
USAREUR United States Army Europe 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
VCDS Vice Chief of Defense Staff 
WG Working Group 
ZENTRA Zentrale Truppenausbildung (German) 
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APPENDIX A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN 
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APPENDIX B. CANADIAN FORCES TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR 
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Time/ 
Date 
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APPENDIX C. BASIC COURSE DEMOGRAPHICS FOR THE 
CANADIAN PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER  
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